{"title":"Social welfare maximization of tourist bus service system in the M/M/1 queue with strategic tourists","authors":"Nidhi Nidhi, Sudeep Singh Sanga","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024129","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Tourism is experiencing a transformative phase in its development, playing a pivotal role in\nthe country’s economic growth. The potential for further advancement lies in effective tourism\nmanagement. Recognizing this vital aspect, the present study investigates the application of the\nM/M/1 queueing model, considering the strategic behavior of tourists in a tourist bus service\n(TBS) system. A TBS system involves the provision of bus services to tourists, ensuring convenient\nand efficient travel to various destinations. Understanding the phenomenon of balking\nas a strategic behavior of tourists is crucial, where tourists strategically decide whether to join\nor balk based on the queue length, thereby highlighting its impact on the dynamics of tourists’\ndecision-making. In the proposed model, our attention is directed toward understanding the\nequilibrium and socially optimal strategies adopted by incoming tourists through a reward-cost\nstructure in the observable queue. This structure allows us to analyze and identify the most effective\nand efficient strategies for tourists based on the balance between the rewards they receive\nand the costs they incur. Furthermore, government strategies involve interventions and policies\nby authorities to regulate and optimize the functioning of the TBS system. These strategies\nmay include the implementation of subsidies or taxes on buses aimed at influencing bus arrival\nrates. We examine how governmental strategies are employed to identify the optimal bus buffer\nsize objectively, ultimately seeking to maximize social welfare in the TBS system. Through a\nseries of numerical experiments, we aim to unravel the dynamics of the optimal strategies while\nassessing the impact of varying information levels and TBS system parameters on the overall\nsocietal benefit. The ultimate objective is to pave the way for an optimized and more beneficial\ntourism landscape, fostering positive outcomes in the tourism sector.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"5 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"RAIRO - Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024129","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Tourism is experiencing a transformative phase in its development, playing a pivotal role in
the country’s economic growth. The potential for further advancement lies in effective tourism
management. Recognizing this vital aspect, the present study investigates the application of the
M/M/1 queueing model, considering the strategic behavior of tourists in a tourist bus service
(TBS) system. A TBS system involves the provision of bus services to tourists, ensuring convenient
and efficient travel to various destinations. Understanding the phenomenon of balking
as a strategic behavior of tourists is crucial, where tourists strategically decide whether to join
or balk based on the queue length, thereby highlighting its impact on the dynamics of tourists’
decision-making. In the proposed model, our attention is directed toward understanding the
equilibrium and socially optimal strategies adopted by incoming tourists through a reward-cost
structure in the observable queue. This structure allows us to analyze and identify the most effective
and efficient strategies for tourists based on the balance between the rewards they receive
and the costs they incur. Furthermore, government strategies involve interventions and policies
by authorities to regulate and optimize the functioning of the TBS system. These strategies
may include the implementation of subsidies or taxes on buses aimed at influencing bus arrival
rates. We examine how governmental strategies are employed to identify the optimal bus buffer
size objectively, ultimately seeking to maximize social welfare in the TBS system. Through a
series of numerical experiments, we aim to unravel the dynamics of the optimal strategies while
assessing the impact of varying information levels and TBS system parameters on the overall
societal benefit. The ultimate objective is to pave the way for an optimized and more beneficial
tourism landscape, fostering positive outcomes in the tourism sector.