Social welfare maximization of tourist bus service system in the M/M/1 queue with strategic tourists

Nidhi Nidhi, Sudeep Singh Sanga
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Abstract

Tourism is experiencing a transformative phase in its development, playing a pivotal role in the country’s economic growth. The potential for further advancement lies in effective tourism management. Recognizing this vital aspect, the present study investigates the application of the M/M/1 queueing model, considering the strategic behavior of tourists in a tourist bus service (TBS) system. A TBS system involves the provision of bus services to tourists, ensuring convenient and efficient travel to various destinations. Understanding the phenomenon of balking as a strategic behavior of tourists is crucial, where tourists strategically decide whether to join or balk based on the queue length, thereby highlighting its impact on the dynamics of tourists’ decision-making. In the proposed model, our attention is directed toward understanding the equilibrium and socially optimal strategies adopted by incoming tourists through a reward-cost structure in the observable queue. This structure allows us to analyze and identify the most effective and efficient strategies for tourists based on the balance between the rewards they receive and the costs they incur. Furthermore, government strategies involve interventions and policies by authorities to regulate and optimize the functioning of the TBS system. These strategies may include the implementation of subsidies or taxes on buses aimed at influencing bus arrival rates. We examine how governmental strategies are employed to identify the optimal bus buffer size objectively, ultimately seeking to maximize social welfare in the TBS system. Through a series of numerical experiments, we aim to unravel the dynamics of the optimal strategies while assessing the impact of varying information levels and TBS system parameters on the overall societal benefit. The ultimate objective is to pave the way for an optimized and more beneficial tourism landscape, fostering positive outcomes in the tourism sector.
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有战略游客的 M/M/1 队列中旅游巴士服务系统的社会福利最大化
旅游业正处于发展的转型阶段,在国家经济增长中发挥着举足轻重的作用。进一步发展的潜力在于有效的旅游管理。认识到这一重要方面,本研究考察了 M/M/1 排队模型的应用,并考虑了旅游巴士服务(TBS)系统中游客的策略行为。旅游巴士服务系统包括为游客提供巴士服务,确保游客方便快捷地前往各个目的地。游客会根据排队长度战略性地决定是否加入或放弃排队,因此理解游客排队现象作为一种战略行为至关重要,从而突出其对游客决策动态的影响。在所提出的模型中,我们的注意力集中在通过可观测队列中的报酬-成本结构来理解入境游客所采取的均衡策略和社会最优策略。这种结构使我们能够根据游客获得的回报和付出的成本之间的平衡来分析和确定最有效和最高效的策略。此外,政府策略还包括当局采取干预措施和政策,以规范和优化 TBS 系统的运作。这些策略可能包括对巴士实施补贴或征税,以影响巴士到达率。我们研究了如何运用政府策略来客观地确定最佳的巴士缓冲区大小,最终在 TBS 系统中寻求社会福利的最大化。通过一系列数值实验,我们旨在揭示最优策略的动态变化,同时评估不同信息水平和 TBS 系统参数对整体社会福利的影响。我们的最终目标是为优化更有益的旅游景观铺平道路,促进旅游业取得积极成果。
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