Monitoring and Home Bias in Global Hiring: Evidence from an Online Labor Platform

Abstract

Online labor platforms increasingly use monitoring systems to manage remote workers. This study assesses whether and how these systems mitigate employer bias in hiring foreign versus domestic workers. Leveraging the exogenous introduction of a monitoring system for time-based projects on a leading online labor platform, we employ a difference-in-differences model to estimate the impact of monitoring systems on mitigating employers’ tendency to bias against hiring foreign workers (home bias). Results indicate a significant reduction in home bias, along with a 15% increase in the hiring of foreign workers following the introduction of the monitoring system. The mitigation effect is notably stronger in high-routine projects or when employers lack prior positive experiences with foreign workers, two scenarios characterized by low external uncertainty and high internal uncertainty, respectively. Moreover, employers no longer exhibit a stronger home bias in scenarios of lower moral hazard risk or coordination costs. These findings lend support to the effectiveness of monitoring systems in mitigating employers’ home bias through facilitating contractual control and coordination. Our study offers important implications for the design of online labor platforms and policymaking.