Gossip, power, and advice: Gossipers are conferred less expert power

Abstract

Gossip harms power. Across 6 pre-registered primary studies and 7 pre-registered supplemental studies, we demonstrate that a reputation for engaging in negative gossip (sharing negatively-valanced information about an absent target) reduces expert power (power derived from being regarded as a superior source of expertise). A reputation for engaging in negative gossip harms expert power in two ways: (1) it reduces the likelihood that others will ask experts for advice, even when experts are clearly competent, and (2) it harms perceptions of the experts' competence. We also find that reputations for general, neutral, and sometimes even positive gossip reduce the likelihood that experts are asked for advice. Our results advance our understanding of who gains power in organizations and highlight an important cost of gossip for both individuals and their organizations. Our findings also underscore the important relationship between advice and power. Whether or not and from whom individuals seek advice determines who is accorded power.