Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2023

Abstract

Australia continued to commit to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the rest of the world. While foreign policy has clearly shifted under the Albanese government, it appears that Australia has no real appetite for developing “a middle path for a middle power”.2 Australia has long been trying to ‘balance’ its major security and economic partners, whilst knowing full well that security relationships ultimately matter most. Harking back to the China choice debate, it's now clearer than ever that Australia will ‘choose’ the United States if conflict were to occur between the United States and China, if it were ever in doubt! Still, Australia does not want to make an exclusive choice unless it must. Clearly, good relations with China are beneficial for the Australian economy and the period under review saw marked improvements in the relationship, which was a win for those exporters previously shut out of the Chinese market.

The Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military response was the dominant international news story of the six-month period. The Israel/Palestine issue fits uncomfortably into the US-centric Australian security framework, with the government concerned not to differ too much from the US position of unequivocal support for Israel. This is despite Albanese's previous support for the Palestinian cause and his status as a founding member of the Parliamentary Friends of Palestine group.3 While the United States eventually made some efforts to temper the intensity of the Israeli response and provide support for the people of Gaza, there were huge casualties - including many children – and the widescale destruction of buildings and infrastructure. In the final days of the year, the Israeli military response led South Africa to institute proceedings against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Israel/Palestine comes and goes as a significant issue for Australian foreign policy, inserting itself into the policy sphere in reaction to events on the ground in the Middle East. It is the possibility of a wider Middle Eastern conflict that will perhaps dominate coming periods of review.

Another clear theme of the period was a continuation of the Albanese government's efforts to engage with the Indo-Pacific, with Ministers connected to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade making regular visits and engaging with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), Southeast Asia and India.4

Wong attended the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Suva in mid-September, meeting with Fijian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Sitiveni Rabuka to “discuss enhancing our Partnership, strengthening our economies, responding to the climate crisis and delivering for our shared regional interests”.15

The following month Wong announced the new Pacific Engagement Visa, which “will enable up to 3,000 nationals of Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste to migrate to Australia as permanent residents each year [and] create new opportunities for the people of the Pacific and Timor-Leste to live, work and be educated in Australia – strengthening diaspora communities, and encouraging greater cultural, business and educational exchange”.16 This was followed up in November with additional support for Pacific Engagement Visa holders and Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme families including access to Medicare, student loans, family tax benefits and the child care subsidy.17

In mid-October the Prime Minister of Fiji Sitiveni Rabuka embarked on a 4-day official Guest of Government visit. At Bilateral talks during the visit, Albanese and Rabuka – in a Joint Statement – noted that the “updated Vuvale Partnership elevates our shared commitment to tackling climate change and strengthening our economic and trade partnership. It also has an increased focus on human development, First Nations' peoples and culture, skills development and cyber security”.18

In early November, Albanese and Conroy attended the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' Meeting in the Cook Islands. According to Albanese “Australia sees the Pacific as family and none of us can achieve the future we want alone”.19 Whilst at the Forum Albanese “briefed Leaders on the Government's action to reduce Australia's emissions and build our clean energy industries”.20 Commitments included $350 million for regional climate infrastructure, including $75 million for “off-grid and community scale renewable energy in remote and rural parts of the Pacific”. There would also be a contribution to the Pacific Resilience Facility and the Green Climate Fund. Albanese and the Prime Minister of Tuvalu Kausea Natano also announced the elevation of the bilateral relationship to “a more advanced, integrated and comprehensive partnership – the Falepili Union”.21 After the Forum Albanese talked up “Australia's commitment to deepening its engagement in the Pacific and addressing the shared challenges facing us all, including shaping a peaceful, stable and prosperous Pacific, and the impacts of climate change”.22

In early December the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, James Marape visited Australia for an official visit. Australia and PNG signed a Bilateral Security Agreement: “a legally-binding framework to deepen our security cooperation – in traditional areas of defence, policing, border and maritime security, and also non-traditional areas of cyber security, climate change, gender-based violence and critical infrastructure”.23 The Agreement “fulfils a commitment under our Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership”. Albanese also announced a $200 million commitment to Papua New Guinea's “national security priorities”, which will provide “full circle support for Papua New Guinea's internal security, from police to courts to correctional services”.

Continuing on the security theme, Defence Minister Richard Marles visited New Caledonia “to participate in the eighth annual South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM), hosted by France”. Whilst there he held bilateral meetings with SPDMM nations, including the host, France, “to discuss Australia and France's growing defence relationship”. During the six-month period, Australia provided a Guardian-class Patrol Boat and two new PAC 750 light transport aircraft to Papua New Guinea, and a Guardian-class Patrol Boat, the Nafanua III, to Samoa. Australia also signed a bilateral security agreement with Vanuatu in mid-December.

Australian policy-makers also engaged with their New Zealand counterparts during the period. On 26 July, Albanese went to NZ to meet with then New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins in Wellington. As usual at these events, the two Prime Ministers noted that the relationship “is unlike any other,” wherein “shared values, common outlook and people-to-people links underpin a critical partnership”. The leaders noted that 2023 marked some significant milestones for the relationship: “the 40th anniversary of the world leading Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement that has transformed our economies and societies; the 50th anniversary of the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, a landmark achievement that facilitated seamless movement of people between our nations; and the 80th anniversary of the establishment of High Commissions in our respective capitals”.24 The leaders also committed to the Trans-Tasman Roadmap to 2035. The roadmap has 5 priority themes: sustainable, inclusive and prosperous economies; security and resilience; active partners in the Pacific; upholding shared principles and values; and our peoples.25

While the above review makes clear the commitment of Australia to the Pacific under the Albanese government, there continues to be a very large elephant in the room at all bilateral and multilateral meetings. Climate change and resulting “sea level rise, stronger cyclones, marine heatwaves and ocean acidification pose existential threats” to PICs.26 Morgan pointed out, PICs want “Albanese to support a regional declaration for a phaseout of fossil fuels”. At the 2022 PIF Albanese, along with other leaders declared a Climate Emergency and although Australia talks a good game on climate change, under the Albanese government, it watered down “some language in the final Pacific Islands Forum communique, which says only that leaders ‘aspire’ to the Port Vila call” for a Just and Equitable Transition to a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific.27 Fully embracing such a commitment would have significant political consequences with the potential for a Coalition and resource industry campaign against the government. It is also likely that vital sections of the media would back this campaign. Politically, the government needs to consider both its left and right flanks. Unfortunately for PICs, the attack from the right is more electorally salient. Given the nature of the preferential voting system it can aim simply to be better than the Coalition on environmental issues to garner preferences from the left. It is unlikely that PICs see such political machinations in a favourable light.

In late August, Wong visited Vietnam for the second time. She remarked that the visit was “a clear statement of the Albanese Government's priorities and an opportunity to further build on our work to shape the region we want. It follows recent visits to Vietnam by Prime Minister Albanese and Trade and Tourism Minister Farrell”.39 In early September Australia and Vietnam celebrated the 5o years of diplomatic relations.

Farrell, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Tim Watts and Assistant Minister for Trade Tim Ayres announced an upgrade to the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA). The statement noted that the agreement will include key commitments on sustainable and inclusive trade, facilitating enhanced cooperation on environmental protection, green economy, labour issues, and women's economic empowerment. Since it first entered into force in 2010, AANZFTA has been the central pillar of Australia's trade and investment relationship with ASEAN members”.40 Watts also visited Indonesia to for the 55th ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting in Semarang and the Second Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Ministers' Meeting.

In November, through a series of visits Marles acted to strengthen Australia's Defence ties with the region. In Mid-November he travelled to Indonesia “to further practical cooperation in the Australia-Indonesia defence partnership”.41 Later in the month, he travelled to the Philippines to sign a Strategic Partnership with the aim to establish “an enduring framework for closer cooperation”. This was followed by “the inaugural Maritime Cooperative Activity in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines [representing] the practical implementation of our Strategic Partnership”.42

In late October Albanese visited Washington DC on the invitation of President Biden. The leaders issued a joint statement reiterating the regular talking point that Australia and the United States “are inseparably linked by our common democratic values and the three pillars of our alliance: defence, economic, and climate and clean energy cooperation”.50 The statement noted that the two countries were “expanding our partnership into new domains to reflect the evolution of our relationship and the growing complexity of global and regional challenges”, including “the pursuit of new areas of cooperation on science and critical and emerging technologies so that we can build an ‘Innovation Alliance’”.

In early December, Marles met with United States Defense Secretary Lloyd J and United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence Grant Shapps at the Defense Innovation Unit Headquarters in California “to discuss the AUKUS enhanced defense and security partnership”. The joint statement “reaffirmed the three nations' commitment to maximize the strategic and technological advantage of AUKUS by combining national strengths and pooling resources to deliver game-changing capabilities”.52

In late July Australia and the United States conducted Exercise Talisman Sabre, Australia's largest bilateral military exercise with the United States providing “a practical demonstration of our commitment to working with our international partners to maintain the security and stability of our region”.53 The event was marred by the death of four Australian military personnel. The United States commissioned its Navy ship, the USS Canberra, in Sydney in late July. Marles noted that its commissioning “reflects the long-standing friendship and alliance between Australia and the US and our shared commitment to upholding the rules-based order”.54

Augmenting Australia's attempts to bolster its security in the region through the US Alliance, AUKUS and the Quad, on the 14^th of August Marles and Wong hailed the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement, which “provides the legal framework for greater defence cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and Japan Self-Defense Force”. The Ministers noted that the Agreement is the “first visiting forces agreement that Japan has struck with any country outside the United States”.55

The fifth Japan-Australia Ministerial Economic Dialogue was held on 8 October in Melbourne, co-chaired by Farrell and Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Nishimura Yasutoshi. A joint statement with Minister for Climate Change and Energy Chris Bowen, and Minister for Resources and Minister for Northern Australia Madeleine King “recognised that Australia and Japan's Special Strategic Partnership was stronger and more important than ever, underpinned by common values, deep economic complementarity, and enduring people-to-people links”.56

In late October Marles visited the Republic of Korea and Japan for Defence Ministers' Meetings. This marked Marles second trip to Korea for the year and on this second trip he contributed to “a panel discussion at the Seoul Defense Dialogue – an annual multilateral forum considering security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and peace on the Korean peninsula”.57 In a speech at the opening of the Dialogue Marles noted that “the shadow of war still haunts us. North Korea remains to this day an enormous source of insecurity, impoverishing its people even as it invests in an illegal nuclear and ballistic missile weapons programs”.58

On 7 November, Wong met with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamikawa Yōko and Japanese National Security Advisor Akiba Takeo in Japan. Wong reiterated at her third visit to Japan since becoming Foreign Minister that Australia and Japan “have never been closer. Australia is committed to remaining a long-term energy security partner for Japan while taking ambitious climate action together”.59

In mid-November Wong and Marles visited India to meet with their ministerial counterparts – Minister of Defence of India, Shri Rajnath Singh, and Minister of External Affairs of India, Dr. S. Jaishankar – and attend the second India-Australia 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi. Wong argued that the “Australia-India relationship has never been more consequential. We are working together through our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, as Quad partners and beyond to promote a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region”.60 Following the Dialogue the Ministers released a joint statement expressing “deep concern over the war in Ukraine and its tragic humanitarian consequences”. They also “reaffirmed that they stand with Israel against terrorism and called for adherence to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians”. Other issues covered were “the deteriorating situation in Myanmar and its impacts on regional security and stability”. They also “reaffirmed their commitment to continue deepening defence and security engagement by enhancing interoperability, cooperating on situational and domain awareness, intensifying maritime cooperation across the region, and exploring opportunities to grow connections on defence industrial cooperation”.61

In early September Albanese attended the East Asia Summit and met with China's Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines.66 At the same time, the 7th Australia-China High Level Dialogue was held in Beijing on 7 September, “providing a platform for senior representatives from industry, government, academia, media and the arts to exchange perspectives across the breadth of Australia and China's bilateral relationship”.67 The Australian delegation was led by former Labor Minister Craig Emerson.

There was more good news for the relationship in October when Albanese and Wong confirmed in a joint statement that Australian Citizen Cheng Lei “has arrived safely home in Australia and has been reunited with her family, after more than three years of detention in China”.68 Ms Lei had been detained for three years on allegations that she shared state secrets. It appears that she was a victim of the worsening bilateral relationship in 2020.

Later in the month an Australian ship HMAS Toowoomba was harassed by a PLA-N Destroyer in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone. The Chinese Ship “was detected operating its hull-mounted sonar in a manner that posed a risk to the safety of the Australian divers who were forced to exit the water”. On 18 November, Marles reported that the Government “has expressed its serious concerns to the Chinese Government following an unsafe and unprofessional interaction with a People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) destroyer”.73

The Ukraine/Russia issue has been much less problematic for the government with high levels of support for Ukraine and antipathy for Russia prevalent in the community.74 In July, Albanese, Marles, and Wong announced that Australia would provide 30 additional Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles to Ukraine, “demonstrating our ongoing commitment to their defence against Russia's aggression”.75 In late October the government announced a further $20 million package of military assistance. A joint media release noted that “this new support takes Australia's overall assistance to Ukraine to approximately $910 million”.76 To top off the commitments for the period, in December, Wong and Marles announced that “Australia will extend and expand its commitment to the training of recruits from the Armed Forces of Ukraine as part of Operation Kudu, throughout 2024”.77

In July the government announced further targeted sanctions against “35 entities in Russia's defence, technology and energy sectors, and 10 individuals, including Russian Ministers and senior officials, and senior military personnel in Belarus”.78 On 25 September, the government extended the 35% punitive tariffs on goods imported from Russia and Belarus until October 2025. In a joint statement Wong and Farrell stated that “Australia is working closely with international partners to impose costs on Russia, through targeted sanctions and trade measures that diminish Russia's ability to fund its illegal and immoral war in Ukraine”.79 In December Australia “imposed Magnitsky-style targeted financial sanctions and travel bans on three Federal Security Service agents involved in the poisoning of prominent Russian opposition figure and pro-democracy activist, Vladimir Kara-Murza, as well as “targeted financial sanctions and travel bans on ten individuals, including a Russian Deputy Minister”. Wong stated that “Australia calls on Russia to comply with its human rights obligations under international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”.80

Wong and Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus released a joint statement on 20 September, joining with 31 other countries, to support Ukraine's case against Russia. The case, “alleges Russia has violated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide … Australia continues to call on Russia to comply with the ICJ's legally binding order of 16 March 2022 to immediately withdraw its military forces from Ukraine”.81 In November Wong criticised Russia's decision to revoke its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which she argued was “an affront to all who want a world without nuclear weapons”.82

In December Wong and Minister for Home Affairs Clare O'Neil criticised Russian cyber targeting of democratic processes. Following the UK's disclosure that “a unit within Russia's Federal Security Service's (FSB) Centre 18, known as Star Blizzard, has been responsible for cyber operations targeting a range of political entities and democratic institutions” they stated that Australia “joins the United Kingdom and other international partners in expressing serious concerns about attempts to use cyber operations to interfere with democratic processes”.83

Israeli settlement building in the occupied territories, however, clearly led to some changes of mind over time. In 2017 Gareth Evans and Bob Hawke urged Australia to officially recognise the state of Palestine.88 Today Australia is committed to a two-state solution, an outcome that current Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has rejected.89 The Albanese government – particularly the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister – has been very reluctant to criticise Israel despite the savagery of the military assault on Gazan civilians and the enormous loss of life.

The period started with Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, issuing a Joint Statement with the Canadian and United Kingdom Foreign Ministers, expressing their “deep concern” over Israel's approval of 5,700 new settlement units in the West Bank. The statement attempted to provide an even-handed response to “condemn all forms of terrorism and violence against civilians, including the terrorist attack on June 20 in Eli targeting Israeli civilians. We also condemn the reprehensible and ongoing settler violence targeting Palestinians”.90 The difference in wording provides an interesting contrast in official attitudes: Palestinians commit terrorism, whilst Israelis commit violence. The previous day, Prime Minister Albanese had expressed his support for a two-state solution.91

Soon after the attack, Israel's military response, the cutting of electricity, and the blocking of food and fuel led to growing international concern about the plight of the people of Gaza. Six days after the attack Israel warned more than one million Gazans to evacuate their homes and move to Southern Gaza. Within a week it was clear that conditions in Gaza were, according to the program director for Human Rights Watch, “about as bad as it can get”.95 With such wanton destruction, it was difficult for the government not to make some effort to appear concerned about Gazans. On 14 October, Australia pledged $10 million in humanitarian assistance for civilians affected by the conflict in Gaza.96 Another $15 million was committed on 26 October.97 Key government Ministers stressed Israel's right to self-defence, whilst pointing out “that the way it exercised that right matters”. Wong stressed that Israel must observe international law and the rules of war”.98 Calls for Australia to support a cease-fire, fell initially on deaf ears, with the government calling instead for “restraint” and “humanitarian pauses”.99

Opposition leader, Peter Dutton, criticised Wong's calls for restraint, arguing “this is not the time for restraint and people who try to draw a parallel or argue equivalence between Israeli activity now in their retaliation for these strikes and the barbaric attacks that we've seen by Hamas, I mean, there is no comparison and it's appalling”.100 Despite these efforts to emphasise differences between the Coalition and Labor on the issue, the real distinction was between the two of them and the Greens, who called immediately for a cease-fire.101 On the 16^th of October, the Greens stated that they “refused to support the looming invasion of Gaza, saying the government must take steps to stop an invasion that will turn a humanitarian crisis into a catastrophe”.102

As the conflict escalated, domestic protests against Israel's military actions grew louder as did the voices of Australia's Jewish community in response. Polarised views on the conflict within the community led to accusations of bias and anti-Semitism. ABC journalist, Antoinette Lattouf, was sacked by the ABC, after re-sharing a Human Rights Watch post about the war. Subsequently it was reported that the ABC had been lobbied by activists to remove Lattouf.103 Claims pro-Palestinian protestors had chanted “Gas the Jews” at a demonstration were later found to be wrong.104 On the 18^th of November, the Government “imposed counter-terrorism financing sanctions on eight persons and one entity in response to the acts of terrorism perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023”.105

With the evidence of a humanitarian tragedy mounting in mid-December, Albanese issued a Joint Statement with the Prime Ministers of Canada and New Zealand supporting “urgent international efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire”. However, the parties argued that this “cannot be one-sided. Hamas must release all hostages, stop using Palestinian civilians as human shields, and lay down its arms. There is no role for Hamas in the future governance of Gaza”.106 In the Annual Lowy Speech on 18 December Albanese argued that the right for Israel to defend itself needed to be balanced against Israel's need “to respect international humanitarian law … None of us should abandon hope in the ultimate goal: a two-state solution, with Israelis and Palestinians living securely and prosperously within internationally-recognised borders”.107

In December, the Australian government refused a request for Australia to send a warship as part of the Combined Maritime Forces task force to combat Houthi forces in Yemen attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Despite media efforts to argue that Australia was rejecting a US request, Albanese pointed out that “this wasn't a request to be clear from the US Government to my Government. This was a general request to a range of nations for support there. Of course, our first priority is in our own region, and certainly the United States understands the important role that we're playing, including freedom of navigation and other issues in our region”.108 Nevertheless, the request was still seen as a rebuff to a US request.109

Albanese began a busy schedule of international engagements with a trip to Europe for the NATO Leaders' Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania on the 11–12 July. In mid-September, Albanese attended the 3rd Annual ASEAN-Australia Summit and the 18th East Asia Summit in Jakarta. At the ASEAN-Australia Summit, the leaders “discussed how they could work together to alleviate food security pressures impacting their communities”. At the East Asia Summit, Albanese “reaffirmed Australia's commitment to deepening engagement with our Southeast Asia partners and working with them to address shared challenges such as the climate crisis” and “discussed key strategic issues with regional counterparts – including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the crisis in Myanmar and the South China Sea”.110 Following these meetings Albanese attended the G20 Leaders' Summit in New Delhi “to discuss collective responses to the world's most pressing economic challenges”. Albanese revealed that the leaders discussed “global measures to ease cost-of-living pressures, including free, fair and rules-based trade, enhancing supply chain resilience and shoring up food and energy security”. Albanese argued that “Australia's attendance at the G20 Summit allows our country to work with the world's major economies to shape solutions for our region and the world”.111

On 7 September Farrell celebrated the reopening of the UK market for the Queensland sugar industry. The agreement “provides Australian agricultural exporters access to the UK market not experienced since the UK joined the European Economic Community (as it then was) on 1 January 1973”.119 Farrell also attended the G7 Trade Ministers' Meeting in Osaka, noting that it was “the first time Australia has been invited … as an outreach partner”.

One of the key trade developments of the period was the collapse of Australia-EU free trade negotiations. Conroy met with European Commission Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis “to progress outstanding issues in the negotiations, pressing for the best possible outcome for our producers, our businesses, our workers, and our consumers”.120 He warned that “I have made it very clear Australia will not sign a deal for the sake of it, and I meant it”. This turned out to be the case with Farrell announcing that “My job as Australia's Trade Minister is to get the best deal that we can for our producers, our businesses, our workers, and our consumers. Unfortunately, we have not been able to make progress”.121 The collapse of negotiations led to both sides accusing the other of an unwillingness to compromise.122

Management of the Australia-United States-China strategic triangle and Israel/Palestine can become important domestic political issues and widespread protests against Israel in Australia and around the world also had the United States in sight given its military support for Israel. There is some significant support for the Palestinian cause on the left of Australian politics, but in polling during the period, and immediately after, the dominant opinion was for Australia not to get involved in the conflict.127 It will be interesting to see whether this changes as news of further loss of life comes to light. The Israel/Palestine issue raises some important tensions in Australia's support for international law and the so-called rules-based order. The Ukraine-Russia War provides fewer tensions for Australian foreign and domestic policy concerns and the period saw a continuation of Australia's unconditional support for Ukraine.

No conflicts of Interest.