Australian Journal of Politics and History最新文献

For much of the second half of 2023, Western Australian (WA) state politics adjusted to the new reality that the towering figure of Mark McGowan had departed. This departure immediately led many participants and observers to predict a return to more conventional political battles, and a much more even state election in 2025.

After taking office on 8 June, the new Premier of WA, Roger Cook did not enjoy much of a political honeymoon. Widespread criticism over new Aboriginal Cultural Heritage laws led to a humiliating government backflip, while the juvenile justice system witnessed tragedy and turmoil. Nevertheless, the government achieved some major legislative milestones, while a new electoral distribution for the 2025 state election renewed tensions between the Nationals and Liberals.

The first major electoral test for the Cook Government came on 29 July, in McGowan's old seat of Rockingham. Unsurprisingly, McGowan had been incredibly popular in Rockingham, achieving a primary vote of 82.75% in the 2021 election, representing a two-party preferred margin of 88-12 against the Liberals. In a drive for renewal, the Labor party selected 28-year-old Magenta Marshall, a former campaign strategist and electorate officer. For their part, the Liberal party selected resources recruitment consultant Peter Hudson, who was just 21. Hayley Edwards, Deputy Mayor for the City of Rockingham, failed to win Labor preselection, and then stood as an independent candidate. Whilst local issues featured prominently in the campaign, broader statewide issues such as the rising costs of living, Labor's contentious cultural heritage laws and the state of the public health system were all under the microscope.

Labor's performance in Rockingham under McGowan was unsustainable and the by-election did see a massive swing of 33% swing away from the Government. They still achieved a primary vote of 49% however, and the eventual two party preferred margin was 65-35 against the Liberals. Much of the swing from Labor did not go to the Liberals, but rather to a swag of other candidates; Edwards picked up 16%, just behind the Liberals, and finished second after preferences, while the Legalise Cannabis party achieved 7%, outpolling the Greens. The result indicated that the next state election in 2025 would be closer, but it was unclear how many people were ready to support the Liberals again.

The latter half of 2023 saw the official redistribution of the WA State Electoral Boundaries, for the 2025 election. The redistribution had to take into account population growth in Perth, and a decline in the population in regional WA, particularly in agricultural areas. Broadly speaking, the principal change was the merging of two regional seats both held by the National party, the seats of Moore and North West Central. Accompanying this was the creation of a new seat in Perth's southeastern suburbs called Oakford. Whilst the new boundaries delivered one additional no

As the year 2023 unfolded the Albanese government initially seemed buoyed after the by-election win in the Victorian seat of Aston, improving their majority to five seats in the lower house, and the seeming inability of the Coalition parties under opposition leader Peter Dutton to become a formidable opponent or offer alternative policy agendas. The May Budget, with some modest cost of living relief of $14.6 billion to welfare recipients, had largely sank like a stone by the time parliament returned on 31st July after the winter break. Rising community concern was caused by rising inflation still trending over 4 per cent in December 2023, and a recent spate of cash rate increases by the Reserve Bank (12 increases of 0.25 per cent over 13 months in 2022–23; only one under the Coalition, and 11 under Labor) which had seen mortgage rates accelerate rising to between 5 and 7 per cent depending on loan terms and type of borrowing (interest only or standard). Inflation was spurred principally by a variety of factors, including home mortgages and rents, meat and groceries, insurance increases, petrol and electricity costs, medical and health costs, and transport.

Australia was also witnessing a slowing of economic growth with GDP falling to 1.4 per cent by December, unemployment rose to 3.9 per cent and job vacancies declined, business investment was modest, while household savings were at a historically low 3.2 per cent. There was considerable media commentary prediction a looming recession, and only increased government spending prevented one from actually occurring. The PM and Treasurer attempted to put a brave face on these austere developments while pre-occupied, and some would argue distracted, by the political priority of holding a referendum on Indigenous recognition. As politics took centre-stage on the government's agenda, the government was accused of neglecting its primary responsibilities of sound economic management and protecting national security.

Anthony Albanese was increasingly accused of breaking a long list of election promises, including reversing Labor's full commitment given innumerable times to the Stage 3 tax cuts, adverse changes to superannuation “nest-egg” entitlements purely to raise taxation, the much heralded election commitment to lower electricity prices when prices were sky-rocketing, reversing many labour market reforms to reinstate union influence and the near-abolition of casual work and the gig economy, pursuing anti-productivity agendas, the absence of any coherent water management plan for the Murray-Darling Basin. Labor was also criticised for either poor policy development or mismanagement in a range of portfolios, including inertia in defence, confused energy policy, inadequate aged care management and a pharmacists revolt over scripts, a poor inquiry into the COVID responses and lockdowns, uncontrolled migration, including unauthorised entries, and the reckless proliferation in international st

Australia continued to commit to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the rest of the world. While foreign policy has clearly shifted under the Albanese government, it appears that Australia has no real appetite for developing “a middle path for a middle power”.2 Australia has long been trying to ‘balance’ its major security and economic partners, whilst knowing full well that security relationships ultimately matter most. Harking back to the China choice debate, it's now clearer than ever that Australia will ‘choose’ the United States if conflict were to occur between the United States and China, if it were ever in doubt! Still, Australia does not want to make an exclusive choice unless it must. Clearly, good relations with China are beneficial for the Australian economy and the period under review saw marked improvements in the relationship, which was a win for those exporters previously shut out of the Chinese market.

The Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military response was the dominant international news story of the six-month period. The Israel/Palestine issue fits uncomfortably into the US-centric Australian security framework, with the government concerned not to differ too much from the US position of unequivocal support for Israel. This is despite Albanese's previous support for the Palestinian cause and his status as a founding member of the Parliamentary Friends of Palestine group.3 While the United States eventually made some efforts to temper the intensity of the Israeli response and provide support for the people of Gaza, there were huge casualties - including many children – and the widescale destruction of buildings and infrastructure. In the final days of the year, the Israeli military response led South Africa to institute proceedings against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Israel/Palestine comes and goes as a significant issue for Australian foreign policy, inserting itself into the policy sphere in reaction to events on the ground in the Middle East. It is the possibility of a wider Middle Eastern conflict that will perhaps dominate coming periods of review.

Another clear theme of the period was a continuation of the Albanese government's efforts to engage with the Indo-Pacific, with Ministers connected to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade making regular visits and engaging with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), Southeast Asia and India.4

Wong attended the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Suva in mid-September, meeting with Fijian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Sitiveni Rabuka to “discuss enhancing our Partnership, strengthening our economies, responding to the climate crisis and delivering for our shared regional interests”.15

The following month Wong announced the new Pacific Engagement Visa, which “will enable up to 3,000 nationals of Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste to migrate to Australia as permanent

The Whitlam Labor government (1972–75) is remembered for ushering in a new era in Indigenous affairs, with the move to “self-determination”, abandoning the longstanding insistence on “assimilation”. The new government intended to deploy the Commonwealth's new legislative power established in the 1967 constitutional referendum to bring in a range of reforms, responding to consistent demands from Indigenous leaders, activists, and supporters through the previous decade. Whitlam's campaign speech promised anti-discrimination legislation, provisions to allow Aboriginal communities to incorporate, and legislation of a system of land tenure. The government faced considerable political obstacles, ultimately curbing the ambitious reform agenda. Nevertheless, these initial efforts to conceptualise representation, recognition, and compensation laid important foundations for the current public debate about “Voice, Treaty, Truth”, following the Uluru Statement from the Heart. This paper explores self-determination through the path-breaking work of the Woodward Aboriginal Land Rights Commission and the establishment of well-resourced land councils as authoritative and legitimate representatives of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory. The Whitlam government's willingness to experiment with power-sharing in the sensitive area of land ownership provided a valuable prototype for genuine engagement with First Nations people today, as Australia contemplates the failure of the constitutional referendum around a Voice to parliament.

One of the great unanswered questions of the Commonwealth Constitution is whether the House of Representatives and Senate are equal or whether one ultimately has more power than the other. The Whitlam Labor government elected in 1972 faced a Senate elected in 1967 and 1970. Despite Senate obstruction, Whitlam proceeded with an ambitious legislative programme through 1973 and into 1974. By April 1974, six bills appeared to provide a “trigger” for the use of the Section 57 deadlock resolution procedure in the Constitution. Section 57 provides that if a bill has been twice passed by the House of Representatives and twice rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General can dissolve both houses and an election is held. If the government is returned and wishes to proceed with the trigger bills, it can again pass them through the House and if they are again rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General can convene a joint sitting of the two houses at which, if the bill is approved by an absolute majority, it is deemed to be passed. Major obstruction in the Senate, including a threat by the Opposition to block supply, led Whitlam to seek a double dissolution, hoping to gain a majority in both houses or, failing that, the opportunity to pass the trigger bills at a joint sitting. The ensuing election saw the return of the Whitlam government in the House but continuing to lack a majority in the Senate. This led to the only joint sitting in federal history, in which all six trigger bills were passed. But there was a constitutional sting in the tail when the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act was subsequently found by the High Court not to have been validly passed. This case is argued to have made s57 potentially unworkable. The 1974 double dissolution stands in stark contrast to the 1975 double dissolution, which is argued here to be its “Evil Twin.” There have been three further double dissolutions since 1975: 1983, 1987, and 2016, but no more joint sittings. In 1987, there was set to be a joint sitting on the proposal for an identity card, but this was thwarted on a technicality. So the 1974 double dissolution achieved the objective of breaking a deadlock but at the cost of revealing a way for a determined Senate to make s57 unworkable.

This contribution examines and reflects on a less-studied area of life during the Whitlam era: the machinery through which the government's expansion of legislated social security entitlements was administered. The government's record in this area warrants attention not only to gain insight into the everyday mechanics of social security administration in the Whitlam era, but also for what we might learn today from how those who administered that programme were pushed to comprehend the significance of the administrative realm as a site of politics, political action, and political relationships in its own right.

The second half of 2023 saw the government progress several long-mooted reforms. It released a new Territory Plan and legislated an increased age of criminal responsibility, saw off a federal challenge to its drug decriminalisation laws, and introduced a voluntary assisted dying bill. Chief Minister and Treasurer Andrew Barr had to explain a reduced credit rating and changes to payroll tax, but the government seemed to be rolling out its program in an orderly fashion.

At the same time, however, a good deal of turmoil emerged from other sources. Most dramatically, Greens MLA Jonathan Davis resigned over allegations of sexual impropriety, but the fallout from Bruce Lehrmann's abortive trial also continued. The local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice referendum campaign was relatively uneventful since few doubted the local result, but the Legislative Assembly's principal no campaigner later lost his position as Deputy Opposition Leader in December.

The Barr government has a history of urban reformism in the face of community opposition, and at midyear this looked set to continue. In February the YIMBY (yes in my back yard) group Greater Canberra launched a campaign to allow townhouses and duplexes in Residential Zone One (RZ1), the low density zone covering over eighty percent of Canberra, and it built considerable momentum in the intervening months (see my previous Chronicle in AJPH 69:4, 2023). In July the Labor Party's ACT conference amended its platform to reflect this demand, albeit with qualifications around timing (Canberra Times, 23 July 2023), and in August the ACT Greens Forum did likewise (Canberra Times, 26 August 2023).

This activity in the governing parties' organisational wings occurred as the government prepared to release a new Territory Plan, which would set out the ACT's zoning scheme and complement the new planning system introduced in June. In early September Barr signalled changes to RZ1 (RiotAct, 5 September 2023), but the plan revealed a week later was more restrictive than reform proponents had hoped. The proposed new rules permitted a second house of up to 120 square meters on RZ1 blocks over 800 square meters, which account for about forty percent of the total. These new dwelling could be unit titled, allowing the two houses to be sold separately, but they were subject to the potentially costly development application process (Canberra Times, 11 September 2023, 15–17 September 2023).

The “new” RZ1 drew criticism from Greater Canberra, as well as the Liberals, who opposed the 120 square meter size limit for second dwellings (Canberra Times, 15 September 2023; RiotAct, 11 September 2023). Both said the changes provided for granny flats, a description Barr and Planning Minister Mick Gentleman rejected (Canberra Times, 15 November 2023). The purpose of the size limit, the former said, was to ensure the new dwellings were affordable, wi

The Whitlam Government has an enduring legacy. Yet scholarship on the Whitlam Government rarely exclusively or extensively focusses on its disability policies. This article applies disability studies to analyse key policies of the Whitlam Government, including increases to the Invalid Pension, Sheltered Employment Allowance and Sickness Benefits, the Australian Assistance Plan, the Handicapped Persons Assistance Act 1974, and the National Compensation Bill 1974 to understand how the Whitlam Government understood people with disability and the ongoing legacy of the policies. It hypothesises that, although from a contemporary viewpoint the policies and how they understand people with disability could be problematised, it postulates that, in the 1970s, they reflect a significant shift in how people with disability were understood and governed. Further, it conjects that the policies can inform current disability policy.

By his own admission, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was not much of an economist, a disclosure that has fuelled criticisms of his government's performance during the economic crises of the 1970s. By contrast, Whitlam was a self-declared internationalist who promoted the domestic and global possibilities of the international system. Of course, twentieth-century economics and internationalism were mutual rather than dichotomous. Accordingly, Whitlam's internationalism provides a vantage point to re-evaluate his economics. This article focusses on how one strand of Whitlam's internationalism — his Third World sympathies and alignments — informed his government's resource policy, as designed by Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor. Rather than seeking to redeem Whitlam's economic credentials via this internationalism, however, I argue Whitlam's appeal to Third Worldism sought to infuse an anti-economics — or, more precisely, a critique of mainstream economic thinking — into Australian resources policy. The legacies of this critique have been enduring. Whitlam and Connor's attempts to establish export controls, foreign investment regulations, and state-owned enterprise galvanised a fierce backlash from miners and libertarian economists. This backlash has helped shape the neoliberal framing of Australian mining and energy policy over the past 40 years. At the same time, with climate change and energy transitions again illuminating the politics of natural resources, Whitlam's Third World critique remains salient.

For the most part of the last decade, several key factors were constant in Victorian politics. These included a dominant Labor Party holding a comfortable majority in the Legislative Assembly, an opposition beset by internal divisions, and Daniel Andrews who had been premier since 2014. The last half of 2023 was to be a significant period for Victorian politics. There would be major changes to the personnel, but not necessarily the policies or general trend, of government and administration in Victoria.

Prior to the last state election in 2022, Victoria had been named as the host jurisdiction for the 2026 Commonwealth Games. This was seen to be a boon, especially as the games would be held across the state. Premier Andrews touted the event would be ‘great for jobs, hospitality and our economy’, while the then-Minister for Tourism, Sport and Major Events, Martin Pakula, was quoted as saying that the Games would ‘deliver major benefits, particularly [for] the regions, and leave a lasting legacy for the growth and development of sport throughout Victoria’ (Premier of Victoria 12 April 2022). When the announcement was made in 2022, the state government estimated that the event would add $3 billion to the state's economy and create thousands of jobs during, and after, the Commonwealth Games (Premier of Victoria 12 April 2022).

It was also planned that 2026 Commonwealth Games would be held in the regions of Geelong, Bendigo, Ballarat, and Gippsland. These regions would stand to benefit from the potential economic activity from the games as well as through the investments in housing and sports infrastructure. Each hub, for example, would have their own athlete villages, while the state government planned to create ‘world-class sports facilities’ which would ‘leave a legacy of affordable housing for the regions and modern sports infrastructure’ after the Games (Premier of Victoria 12 April 2022).

Despite such high ambitions, on 18 July 2023 Daniel Andrews announced that Victoria would cancel the event. In his statement, Premier Andrews cited the growing cost of hosting the event which was estimated to be over $6 billion. As he put it: ‘…the cost of hosting these Games in 2026 is not the 2.6 billion which was budgeted’, rather it was ‘at least $6 billion, and could be as high as $7 billion’ (cited in The Age 18 July 2023).

The Deputy Premier who also had responsibility for the Commonwealth Games, Jacinta Allan, announced that the government would provide support for the regions who had been expecting to host the Games. In particular, the government committed to delivering the infrastructure that had been planned with each region in a package that would cost approximately $2 billion (The Age 18 July 2023).

The government's decision came as a shock to some officials such as the Chief Executive of Commonwealth Games Australia, Craig Philips, who had reportedly been notified of the estimated costs ‘d