Perpetual future contracts in centralized and decentralized exchanges: Mechanism and traders’ behavior

Abstract

This study presents a groundbreaking Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) initiative, focusing on an in-depth exploration of the dynamics and behavior of traders on perpetual future contracts across both centralized exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized exchanges (DEXs). We summarize the features of CEXs and DEXs and propose 4 exchange models that govern the operations of exchanges in different types, allowing for the classification of any exchange into one of these predefined models. Our research also includes an empirical analysis of traders’ behavior in exchanges of the 4 types of models. On DEX of the Virtual Automated Market Making (VAMM) Model, open interest on short and long positions exerts effect on price volatility in opposite direction, attributable to VAMM’s price formation mechanism. In the DEXs with Oracle Pricing Model, we observed a distinct asymmetry in trader behavior between buyers and sellers. Such asymmetry might stem from uninformed traders reacting more strongly to positive news than to negative, leading to a tendency to accumulate long positions. This study sheds light on the potential risks and advantages of using perpetual future contracts within the DeFi space while provides mathematical basis and empirical insights based on which future theoretical works can be configurated, offering crucial insights into the rapidly evolving world of blockchain-based financial instruments.