Earnings myopia and private equity takeovers

IF 4.8 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting Studies Pub Date : 2024-06-28 DOI:10.1007/s11142-024-09844-6

Paul Hribar, Todd Kravet, Trent Krupa

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the role of private equity in alleviating earnings myopia induced by public markets. We first construct a measure of earnings myopia and show that this measure varies as predicted with determinants and effects of myopia. Then we show that public firms exhibiting earnings myopia realize an increased likelihood of takeover by private equity buyers. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that this relation is strongest when costs of earnings myopia are likely higher. Following private equity takeovers, firms exhibiting greater measures of earnings myopia realize improvements to R&D investment and productivity. The results add to the understanding of the role of private equity in identifying and alleviating earnings myopia within U.S. capital markets. This is important given the increasing size of private equity assets under management. Takeover premiums paid for myopic firms suggest a cost of earnings myopia at approximately 6.9% of firm value.

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盈利近视与私募股权收购

我们研究了私募股权在缓解公开市场导致的收益近视方面的作用。我们首先构建了盈利近视的衡量标准，并证明这一衡量标准随近视的决定因素和影响而变化。然后我们证明，表现出盈利近视的上市公司被私募股权收购者收购的可能性会增加。横截面分析表明，当收益近视的成本可能较高时，这种关系最为密切。私募股权收购后，收益近视程度较高的公司在研发投资和生产率方面都有所改善。这些结果加深了人们对私募股权在识别和缓解美国资本市场盈利近视方面的作用的理解。鉴于私募股权管理的资产规模不断扩大，这一点非常重要。为近视企业支付的收购溢价表明，盈利近视的成本约为企业价值的 6.9%。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Accounting Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

7.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Accounting Studies provides an outlet for significant academic research in accounting including theoretical, empirical, and experimental work. The journal is committed to the principle that distinctive scholarship is rigorous. While the editors encourage all forms of research, it must contribute to the discipline of accounting. The Review of Accounting Studies is committed to prompt turnaround on the manuscripts it receives. For the majority of manuscripts the journal will make an accept-reject decision on the first round. Authors will be provided the opportunity to revise accepted manuscripts in response to reviewer and editor comments; however, discretion over such manuscripts resides principally with the authors. An editorial revise and resubmit decision is reserved for new submissions which are not acceptable in their current version, but for which the editor sees a clear path of changes which would make the manuscript publishable. Officially cited as: Rev Account Stud

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