Security control of direct current microgrids under deception attacks—A dynamic event-triggered approach

Abstract

This paper studies the security control of direct current (DC) microgrids under deception attacks, and a dynamic event-triggered mechanism (DETM) is proposed to save constrained network bandwidth. The DETM can reduce the frequency of data communications and exclude Zeno behavior inherently. Then, a time-delay closed-loop system model is built, which integrates parameters of the DC microgrid, the DETM, deception attacks, injection current controller, and network-induced delays in one unified framework. Sufficient conditions are derived for globally exponentially ultimately bounded stability in mean square, which establish the relationship between system performance and the contributing factors such as the DETM, deception attacks, and network delays. Further, a co-design method is presented to derive the parameters of the controller and the DETM in just one step. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method for security control of DC microgrids, achieving 21.5% savings of communication resources while effectively stabilizing the system even 10.7% of the transmitted data that are manipulated by the deception attacks.