Institutional enforceability

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI:10.1007/s10058-024-00358-w

Kerim Keskin

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We introduce a new coalitional refinement of Nash equilibrium. An institution is defined to include: (i) a collection of active coalitions of players that can make joint deviations from any strategy profile; (ii) a partition of that collection, endowed with a priority order that determines which coalition is more important than another coalition; and (iii) a set-valued function that specifies which coalitions are informed about a joint deviation made by another coalition and can respond to that deviation by making a further deviation. The notion of institutional Nash equilibrium only considers joint deviations under the restrictions set by the institution under consideration. First, we reveal how our new equilibrium refinement is related to the existing coalitional refinements of Nash equilibrium. Second, after defining institutional enforceability as an availability of an equilibrium to be realized as a unique institutional Nash equilibrium for some institution, we characterize the conditions for an institutionally enforceable Nash equilibrium in two-player and three-player games.

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机构的可执行性

我们引入了纳什均衡的新联盟细化。机构的定义包括(i) 可以共同偏离任何策略剖面的活跃棋手联盟集合；(ii) 该集合的一个分区，该分区具有优先顺序，它决定了哪个联盟比另一个联盟更重要；(iii) 一个集合值函数，它规定了哪些联盟可以获知另一个联盟所做的共同偏离，并可以通过进一步偏离来应对该偏离。制度纳什均衡的概念只考虑在所考虑的制度所设定的限制条件下的联合偏离。首先，我们将揭示新的均衡细化与现有的纳什均衡联盟细化之间的关系。其次，我们将制度可执行性定义为某一均衡在某一制度下可实现为唯一的制度纳什均衡，然后描述了二人博弈和三人博弈中制度可执行性纳什均衡的条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design

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