Voluntary disclosures by activist investors: the role of activist expectations*

IF 4.8 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting Studies Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI:10.1007/s11142-024-09836-6

Ryan McDonough, Venky Nagar, Jordan Schoenfeld

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Activist investors in a firm often voluntarily release information about their governance intentions to the public. Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that an activist investor will disclose when she expects other investors to respond positively and support her in upcoming corporate control contests. We find that activists’ disclosures are accompanied by positive abnormal returns, reductions in bid-ask spreads, and increases in future earnings relative to similar targets without voluntary activist disclosures. Disclosures by activists who demand a board seat (the most common demand) have the highest announcement returns, and disclosers also win proxy contests and directorships more frequently than non-disclosers. These findings suggest that the activist’s beliefs about investor response in both pricing and voting are an important driver of her disclosure choice.

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激进投资者的自愿披露：激进预期的作用*

公司的激进投资者往往会自愿向公众发布有关其治理意图的信息。自愿披露理论认为，当激进投资者预期其他投资者会积极响应并在即将到来的公司控制权争夺中支持她时，她就会披露信息。我们发现，相对于未自愿披露信息的类似目标公司，激进投资者的信息披露会带来正的异常回报、买卖价差的缩小以及未来收益的增加。要求获得董事会席位（最常见的要求）的激进分子披露信息的公告回报率最高，披露信息的激进分子也比不披露信息的激进分子更频繁地赢得代理权争夺和董事席位。这些研究结果表明，激进分子对投资者在定价和投票两方面反应的看法是其披露选择的重要驱动因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Accounting Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

7.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Accounting Studies provides an outlet for significant academic research in accounting including theoretical, empirical, and experimental work. The journal is committed to the principle that distinctive scholarship is rigorous. While the editors encourage all forms of research, it must contribute to the discipline of accounting. The Review of Accounting Studies is committed to prompt turnaround on the manuscripts it receives. For the majority of manuscripts the journal will make an accept-reject decision on the first round. Authors will be provided the opportunity to revise accepted manuscripts in response to reviewer and editor comments; however, discretion over such manuscripts resides principally with the authors. An editorial revise and resubmit decision is reserved for new submissions which are not acceptable in their current version, but for which the editor sees a clear path of changes which would make the manuscript publishable. Officially cited as: Rev Account Stud

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