{"title":"Moves & Rules: Addressing the Puzzle of Social Rule-Following","authors":"Alma Diamond","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09507-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>I explore a puzzle at the heart of the so-called ‘practice theory of rules’: how can rules, operating as normative standards, be determined by the very actions they govern? I demonstrate how this puzzle has shaped criticism of the practice theory and limited its ability to account for mistake and disagreement within social practices. I identify the reason for these difficulties: an exclusive focus on individual deliberative attitudes which ignores the dynamic interaction between plural and individual deliberation within social practices. Drawing on recent work in social ontology, I construct a framework to capture this dynamism. I distinguish between two deliberative contexts in social practices: background rule-setting and foreground move-making. Social practices involve a complex interplay between these two contexts. With this, I account for the possibility of divergence between practices and the rules governing them, while at the same time retaining an analysis of social rules’ dependence on practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":"207 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09507-2","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I explore a puzzle at the heart of the so-called ‘practice theory of rules’: how can rules, operating as normative standards, be determined by the very actions they govern? I demonstrate how this puzzle has shaped criticism of the practice theory and limited its ability to account for mistake and disagreement within social practices. I identify the reason for these difficulties: an exclusive focus on individual deliberative attitudes which ignores the dynamic interaction between plural and individual deliberation within social practices. Drawing on recent work in social ontology, I construct a framework to capture this dynamism. I distinguish between two deliberative contexts in social practices: background rule-setting and foreground move-making. Social practices involve a complex interplay between these two contexts. With this, I account for the possibility of divergence between practices and the rules governing them, while at the same time retaining an analysis of social rules’ dependence on practices.
期刊介绍:
Law and Philosophy is a forum for the publication of work in law and philosophy which is of common interest to members of the two disciplines of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. It is open to all approaches in both fields and to work in any of the major legal traditions - common law, civil law, or the socialist tradition. The editors of Law and Philosophy encourage papers which exhibit philosophical reflection on the law informed by a knowledge of the law, and legal analysis informed by philosophical methods and principles.