Quantum ontology and intuitions

IF 1.5 1区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI:10.1007/s13194-024-00595-4
Valia Allori
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Abstract

Among the various proposals for quantum ontology, both wavefunction realists and the primitive ontologists have argued that their approach is to be preferred because it relies on intuitive notions: locality, separability and spatiotemporality. As such, these proposals should be seen as normative frameworks asserting that one should choose the fundamental ontology which preserves these intuitions, even if they disagree about their relative importance: wavefunction realists favor preserving locality and separability, while primitive ontologists advocate for spatiotemporality. In this paper, first I clarify the main tenets of wavefunction realism and the primitive ontology approach, arguing that seeing the latter as favoring constructive explanation makes sense of their requirement of a spatiotemporal ontology. Then I show how the aforementioned intuitive notions cannot all be kept in the quantum domain. Consequently, wavefunction realists rank locality and separability higher than spatiotemporality, while primitive ontologists do the opposite. I conclude that however, the choice of which notions to favor is not as arbitrary as it might seem. In fact, they are not independent: requiring locality and separability can soundly be justified by requiring spatiotemporality, and not the other way around. If so, the primitive ontology approach has a better justification of its intuitions than its rival wavefunction realist framework.

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量子本体论与直觉
在关于量子本体论的各种提议中,波函数现实主义者和原始本体论者都认为他们的方法更可取,因为它依赖于直观的概念:位置性、可分性和时空性。因此,这些提议应被视为规范性框架,主张人们应选择保留这些直觉的基本本体论,即使他们对这些直觉的相对重要性存在分歧:波函数实存论者倾向于保留位置性和分离性,而原始本体论者则主张时空性。在本文中,我首先澄清了波函数现实主义和原始本体论方法的主要信条,认为将后者视为倾向于建构性解释是合理的,因为他们要求时空本体论。然后,我将说明上述直观概念如何无法全部保留在量子领域。因此,波函数现实论者将位置性和可分性置于时空性之上,而原始本体论者则相反。不过,我的结论是,选择哪个概念并不像看起来那么随意。事实上,它们并不是相互独立的:要求时空性可以合理地证明位置性和可分离性的合理性,而不是相反。如果是这样的话,原始本体论方法比其对手波函数现实主义框架更能证明其直觉的合理性。
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来源期刊
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
European Journal for Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
13.30%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: The European Journal for Philosophy of Science publishes groundbreaking works that can deepen understanding of the concepts and methods of the sciences, as they explore increasingly many facets of the world we live in. It is of direct interest to philosophers of science coming from different perspectives, as well as scientists, citizens and policymakers. The journal is interested in articles from all traditions and all backgrounds, as long as they engage with the sciences in a constructive, and critical, way. The journal represents the various longstanding European philosophical traditions engaging with the sciences, but welcomes articles from every part of the world.
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