Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z
HyeJeong Han
{"title":"When to recommend no experiment? drug regulation and the institutional shaping of pursuitworthiness","authors":"HyeJeong Han","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7
Pablo Acuña, James Read
We consider the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ approaches introduced by Read (2020a) in the context of the dynamical/geometrical debate. We show that one fruitful way in which to understand this distinction is in terms of what one takes the kinematically possible models of a given theory to represent; moreover, we show that the qualified/unqualified distinction is applicable not only to the geometrical approach (which is the case considered by Read (2020a)), but also to the dynamical approach. Finally, having made these points, we connect them to other discussions of representation and of explanation in this corner of the literature.
{"title":"Qualification and explanation in the dynamical/geometrical debate","authors":"Pablo Acuña, James Read","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ approaches introduced by Read (2020a) in the context of the dynamical/geometrical debate. We show that one fruitful way in which to understand this distinction is in terms of what one takes the kinematically possible models of a given theory to represent; moreover, we show that the qualified/unqualified distinction is applicable not only to the geometrical approach (which is the case considered by Read (2020a)), but also to the dynamical approach. Finally, having made these points, we connect them to other discussions of representation and of explanation in this corner of the literature.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y
Enno Fischer
When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.
{"title":"The pursuitworthiness of experiments","authors":"Enno Fischer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","url":null,"abstract":"When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8
Leon-Philip Schäfer
Ad hominem arguments have, in terms of their relevance for scientific discourses, a peculiar status that seems to be surprisingly unfathomed in modern philosophy of science. The main aim of the current paper is to shed some light on this latent blind spot and to familiarise philosophers of science with some of the recent discussions that this topic has launched in argumentation theory. In particular, I would like to examine whether ad hominem arguments are to be regarded as epistemically detrimental and should be kept out of scientific discussions altogether or whether we should embrace a more nuanced evaluation that allows for the view that such arguments can be legitimate sometimes. While the modern literature in argumentation theory tends to support a remarkably permissive assessment of ad hominem arguments, the paper advocates for a more cautious conclusion: it shows that ad hominem arguments have the potential to damage or even outright destroy the basis of rational discussions, by substituting the factual criticism of theories with the personal denunciation of their creators. Because of this, a careless rehabilitation of such arguments is not recommended.
{"title":"Ad hominem arguments in scientific discourses – rational heuristic or dangerous immunisation strategy?","authors":"Leon-Philip Schäfer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","url":null,"abstract":"Ad hominem arguments have, in terms of their relevance for scientific discourses, a peculiar status that seems to be surprisingly unfathomed in modern philosophy of science. The main aim of the current paper is to shed some light on this latent blind spot and to familiarise philosophers of science with some of the recent discussions that this topic has launched in argumentation theory. In particular, I would like to examine whether ad hominem arguments are to be regarded as epistemically detrimental and should be kept out of scientific discussions altogether or whether we should embrace a more nuanced evaluation that allows for the view that such arguments can be legitimate sometimes. While the modern literature in argumentation theory tends to support a remarkably permissive assessment of ad hominem arguments, the paper advocates for a more cautious conclusion: it shows that ad hominem arguments have the potential to damage or even outright destroy the basis of rational discussions, by substituting the factual criticism of theories with the personal denunciation of their creators. Because of this, a careless rehabilitation of such arguments is not recommended.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9
Thodoris Dimitrakos
{"title":"The uneasy triangle: scientific realism, naturalism and empiricism on scientific change","authors":"Thodoris Dimitrakos","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145847406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-17DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x
Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén
{"title":"Correction to: Scientific progress and modern cosmology","authors":"Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145770645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-12DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x
Kristina Rolin
I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.
{"title":"Expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science","authors":"Kristina Rolin","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","url":null,"abstract":"I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145753233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w
Philippe van Basshuysen
Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its performative power , which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about concentrated performative power , that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.
{"title":"Performative power in science","authors":"Philippe van Basshuysen","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","url":null,"abstract":"Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its <jats:italic>performative power</jats:italic> , which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about <jats:italic>concentrated performative power</jats:italic> , that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145718185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justifying the epistemic authority of science in liberal democracy","authors":"Somogy Varga, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Klemens Kappel","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00703-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00703-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145703862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9
Karl Heuer, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya
This article presents a toy model and a case study on how a mathematical notion gains acceptance over competing alternatives. We argue that the main criteria is success, in the sense of: (a) the new notion fitting the “mathematical landscape” and (b) it empowering mathematicians to prove publishable results in the modern academic landscape. Both criteria go hand in hand. We identify one particular way that both things can be established, namely by creating counterparts of existing structures in another area of mathematics, i.e. by making sure that analogical results hold. Unlike in previous accounts of analogical reasoning, we hold that, sometimes, this process involves intentional creation of parallelisms between domains rather than mere discovery. We show this by discussing the case of Hamiltonicity results for infinite graphs. We argue that a prominent aim of this new notion is to shape the target domain so that knowledge can be transferred from the source domain. In our case study this notion enables knowledge transfer from finite combinatorics to infinite combinatorics in graph theory. We study how the first suggested notion for the counterpart of cycle, namely the notion of the double ray, was replaced by a topologically motivated approach to better fit the general mathematical landscape and thus aiding with knowledge transfer across fields.
{"title":"The making of a mathematical notion by analogy: the case of Hamiltonicity of (locally finite) infinite graphs","authors":"Karl Heuer, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a toy model and a case study on how a mathematical notion gains acceptance over competing alternatives. We argue that the main criteria is success, in the sense of: (a) the new notion fitting the “mathematical landscape” and (b) it empowering mathematicians to prove publishable results in the modern academic landscape. Both criteria go hand in hand. We identify one particular way that both things can be established, namely by creating counterparts of existing structures in another area of mathematics, i.e. by making sure that analogical results hold. Unlike in previous accounts of analogical reasoning, we hold that, sometimes, this process involves intentional creation of parallelisms between domains rather than mere discovery. We show this by discussing the case of Hamiltonicity results for infinite graphs. We argue that a prominent aim of this new notion is to shape the target domain so that knowledge can be transferred from the source domain. In our case study this notion enables knowledge transfer from finite combinatorics to infinite combinatorics in graph theory. We study how the first suggested notion for the counterpart of cycle, namely the notion of the double ray, was replaced by a topologically motivated approach to better fit the general mathematical landscape and thus aiding with knowledge transfer across fields.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145651530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：