Pub Date : 2026-02-05DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00714-9
Maria Şerban
This paper examines the transformation of Craver’s (2009) mutual manipulability (MM) account into the matched interlevel experiments (MIE) framework (Craver et al., 2021) and argues that it amounts to a theoretical reduction of mechanistic constitutive relations to causal mediation. While the MIE account successfully resolves the incoherence challenge that plagued MM, it does so by eliminating the distinctive theoretical content that constitutive categories were supposed to provide. The processual reframing that enables this solution replaces hierarchical part-whole relationships with temporal causal sequences, changing what mechanistic explanations are understood to accomplish. Drawing on paradigmatic action potential experiments, I demonstrate that practices satisfying MIE’s formal requirements consistently establish causal mediation relationships without requiring constitutive interpretation. I address several theoretical defenses of constitutive categories—including interpretive objections about two types of constitution, arguments for distinctive explanatory value, and appeals to mechanistic levels—showing that none can rescue constitutive distinctiveness once constitution is explicitly identified with causal betweenness. Rather than undermining mechanistic approaches, this analysis suggests that their explanatory power derives from methodological sophistication in investigating complex, multi-scale causal structures rather than from categorically distinct constitutive relationships.
{"title":"Rethinking interlevel experiments: no remainder from evidence for causal relations","authors":"Maria Şerban","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00714-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00714-9","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the transformation of Craver’s (2009) mutual manipulability (MM) account into the matched interlevel experiments (MIE) framework (Craver et al., 2021) and argues that it amounts to a theoretical reduction of mechanistic constitutive relations to causal mediation. While the MIE account successfully resolves the incoherence challenge that plagued MM, it does so by eliminating the distinctive theoretical content that constitutive categories were supposed to provide. The processual reframing that enables this solution replaces hierarchical part-whole relationships with temporal causal sequences, changing what mechanistic explanations are understood to accomplish. Drawing on paradigmatic action potential experiments, I demonstrate that practices satisfying MIE’s formal requirements consistently establish causal mediation relationships without requiring constitutive interpretation. I address several theoretical defenses of constitutive categories—including interpretive objections about two types of constitution, arguments for distinctive explanatory value, and appeals to mechanistic levels—showing that none can rescue constitutive distinctiveness once constitution is explicitly identified with causal betweenness. Rather than undermining mechanistic approaches, this analysis suggests that their explanatory power derives from methodological sophistication in investigating complex, multi-scale causal structures rather than from categorically distinct constitutive relationships.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00720-5
Yotam Harel
Theory-deduced predictions might change agents’ beliefs, and thus also agents’ behavior. Since agents react to their beliefs by modifying their behavior to obtain their goals, they might react to a belief inspired by a theory-deduced prediction by modifying their behavior to obtain their goals, and this may have implications for the theory and its predictive success. In this paper, I first theorize this phenomenon. I disqualify past formulations of so-called reflexive predictions and advocate my account of self-defeating and self-fulfilling reactivity. I then examine the implications of three kinds of self-defeating reactivity, weak, strong, and vicious, for predicting. I conclude that self-defeating reactivity makes it impossible to predict, at least in some cases. Finally, I rethink whether self-defeating and self-fulfilling reactivity is exclusive to the human/social sciences or to states of affairs where human beings/social actors are involved. Here, I conclude that while reactivity is not exclusive to the human/social sciences, it is exclusive to cases where agents are involved. Thus, it is exclusive to cases where human beings/social actors are involved only de facto .
{"title":"Self-defeating and self-fulfilling reactivity","authors":"Yotam Harel","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00720-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00720-5","url":null,"abstract":"Theory-deduced predictions might change agents’ beliefs, and thus also agents’ behavior. Since agents react to their beliefs by modifying their behavior to obtain their goals, they might react to a belief inspired by a theory-deduced prediction by modifying their behavior to obtain their goals, and this may have implications for the theory and its predictive success. In this paper, I first theorize this phenomenon. I disqualify past formulations of so-called reflexive predictions and advocate my account of self-defeating and self-fulfilling reactivity. I then examine the implications of three kinds of self-defeating reactivity, weak, strong, and vicious, for predicting. I conclude that self-defeating reactivity makes it impossible to predict, at least in some cases. Finally, I rethink whether self-defeating and self-fulfilling reactivity is exclusive to the human/social sciences or to states of affairs where human beings/social actors are involved. Here, I conclude that while reactivity is not exclusive to the human/social sciences, it is exclusive to cases where agents are involved. Thus, it is exclusive to cases where human beings/social actors are involved only <jats:italic>de facto</jats:italic> .","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00715-8
Nico Dario Müller
{"title":"Lane-Petter’s Pipeline: Why reliably decreasing animal research takes more than replacements","authors":"Nico Dario Müller","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00715-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00715-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146095653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-26DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00697-7
Jennifer S. Jhun
{"title":"Domain demarcation: Herbert Simon meets multiscale modeling","authors":"Jennifer S. Jhun","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00697-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00697-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146048472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-20DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00708-7
William Anthony Penn, Arica Bauer
We argue that scientific projects should be judged as pursuit-worthy in virtue of their dynamicity. We give three non-exhaustive dimensions of dynamicity, developed in the context of three case studies: (1) dynamic responsivity to experimental and observational practices, developed by comparing Ptolemaic astronomical projects to pseudoscientific geocentrism; (2) dynamic responsivity to concurrent developing modeling projects, developed by analyzing epidemiologist risk-assessments and resulting projective choices; (3) responsivity to evolving contexts for application and implementation, the evolution of which is driven by the very development of the project, developed by analyzing the 2013 Eindhoven conference assessment of climate modeling and shaping of policy. We argue in the second half that judgments of dynamism can be philosophically and practically implemented in real-time assessments of current projects. Specifically, tracking responsivity to increasingly stable past practices allows us to track a project’s changing viability, and tracking responsivity to projections of stabilizing projects and practices allows us to track a project’s changing promise. We argue that both of these assessments can be most effectively performed by those who both understand the history and philosophy of science and the specific science projects themselves. Therefore, we argue that embedding philosophers of science, who continue to participate in the philosophical community for assessment of their philosophical work and capability, will yield the best results for judging the worth of pursuing a scientific project. Decisions about the proportional allocation of resources will therefore be made as part of dynamic trajectories of support, rather than static determinations of value and worth.
{"title":"Judging the worth of pursuing: assessing the dynamic responsivity of a project to experimental and model-building practices","authors":"William Anthony Penn, Arica Bauer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00708-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00708-7","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that scientific projects should be judged as pursuit-worthy in virtue of their dynamicity. We give three non-exhaustive dimensions of dynamicity, developed in the context of three case studies: (1) dynamic responsivity to experimental and observational practices, developed by comparing Ptolemaic astronomical projects to pseudoscientific geocentrism; (2) dynamic responsivity to concurrent developing modeling projects, developed by analyzing epidemiologist risk-assessments and resulting projective choices; (3) responsivity to evolving contexts for application and implementation, the evolution of which is driven by the very development of the project, developed by analyzing the 2013 Eindhoven conference assessment of climate modeling and shaping of policy. We argue in the second half that judgments of dynamism can be philosophically and practically implemented in real-time assessments of current projects. Specifically, tracking responsivity to increasingly stable past practices allows us to track a project’s changing viability, and tracking responsivity to projections of stabilizing projects and practices allows us to track a project’s changing promise. We argue that both of these assessments can be most effectively performed by those who both understand the history and philosophy of science and the specific science projects themselves. Therefore, we argue that embedding philosophers of science, who continue to participate in the philosophical community for assessment of their philosophical work and capability, will yield the best results for judging the worth of pursuing a scientific project. Decisions about the proportional allocation of resources will therefore be made as part of dynamic trajectories of support, rather than static determinations of value and worth.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z
HyeJeong Han
{"title":"When to recommend no experiment? drug regulation and the institutional shaping of pursuitworthiness","authors":"HyeJeong Han","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00710-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7
Pablo Acuña, James Read
We consider the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ approaches introduced by Read (2020a) in the context of the dynamical/geometrical debate. We show that one fruitful way in which to understand this distinction is in terms of what one takes the kinematically possible models of a given theory to represent; moreover, we show that the qualified/unqualified distinction is applicable not only to the geometrical approach (which is the case considered by Read (2020a)), but also to the dynamical approach. Finally, having made these points, we connect them to other discussions of representation and of explanation in this corner of the literature.
{"title":"Qualification and explanation in the dynamical/geometrical debate","authors":"Pablo Acuña, James Read","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00716-7","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ approaches introduced by Read (2020a) in the context of the dynamical/geometrical debate. We show that one fruitful way in which to understand this distinction is in terms of what one takes the kinematically possible models of a given theory to represent; moreover, we show that the qualified/unqualified distinction is applicable not only to the geometrical approach (which is the case considered by Read (2020a)), but also to the dynamical approach. Finally, having made these points, we connect them to other discussions of representation and of explanation in this corner of the literature.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y
Enno Fischer
When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.
{"title":"The pursuitworthiness of experiments","authors":"Enno Fischer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","url":null,"abstract":"When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8
Leon-Philip Schäfer
Ad hominem arguments have, in terms of their relevance for scientific discourses, a peculiar status that seems to be surprisingly unfathomed in modern philosophy of science. The main aim of the current paper is to shed some light on this latent blind spot and to familiarise philosophers of science with some of the recent discussions that this topic has launched in argumentation theory. In particular, I would like to examine whether ad hominem arguments are to be regarded as epistemically detrimental and should be kept out of scientific discussions altogether or whether we should embrace a more nuanced evaluation that allows for the view that such arguments can be legitimate sometimes. While the modern literature in argumentation theory tends to support a remarkably permissive assessment of ad hominem arguments, the paper advocates for a more cautious conclusion: it shows that ad hominem arguments have the potential to damage or even outright destroy the basis of rational discussions, by substituting the factual criticism of theories with the personal denunciation of their creators. Because of this, a careless rehabilitation of such arguments is not recommended.
{"title":"Ad hominem arguments in scientific discourses – rational heuristic or dangerous immunisation strategy?","authors":"Leon-Philip Schäfer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","url":null,"abstract":"Ad hominem arguments have, in terms of their relevance for scientific discourses, a peculiar status that seems to be surprisingly unfathomed in modern philosophy of science. The main aim of the current paper is to shed some light on this latent blind spot and to familiarise philosophers of science with some of the recent discussions that this topic has launched in argumentation theory. In particular, I would like to examine whether ad hominem arguments are to be regarded as epistemically detrimental and should be kept out of scientific discussions altogether or whether we should embrace a more nuanced evaluation that allows for the view that such arguments can be legitimate sometimes. While the modern literature in argumentation theory tends to support a remarkably permissive assessment of ad hominem arguments, the paper advocates for a more cautious conclusion: it shows that ad hominem arguments have the potential to damage or even outright destroy the basis of rational discussions, by substituting the factual criticism of theories with the personal denunciation of their creators. Because of this, a careless rehabilitation of such arguments is not recommended.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9
Thodoris Dimitrakos
{"title":"The uneasy triangle: scientific realism, naturalism and empiricism on scientific change","authors":"Thodoris Dimitrakos","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145847406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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