An evolutionary game for analysis of implementation strategies in inter-regional diffusion of clean technology

Abstract

Green transition driven by clean technology diffusion attaches importance to sustainable development. Therefore, choosing the optimal strategy in the inter-regional diffusion of clean technology has attracted the attention of local governments. In this regard, developed regions leading the R&D activities of clean technology can choose to fund or not fund diffusion, and developing regions can adopt absorption strategy or substitution strategy as well. An evolutionary game model was developed in this paper to analyze the stable strategies of local governments in the inter-regional diffusion of clean technology. In general, there are four possible stable equilibrium points. The result indicates that a collaboration relationship aiming at technology transfer among regions is likely to be established when developed regions and developing regions gain more from funding diffusion and subsidizing absorption, respectively. Especially, an increase of incentives from the central government, as well as an increase of cost performing independent clean R&D activities, improves the inter-regional diffusion network. This paper, therefore, provides a mathematical approach to examine the interaction of clean technology diffusion, and sheds light on actor behavior in games of inter-regional coordination.