{"title":"Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption","authors":"Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4311","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5054-5076"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4311","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.
期刊介绍：
Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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