The mismatch between production, order, and demand seriously affects supply chain performance. However, most research focus on the mismatch between the retailer's order and customer's demand, which ignores the influence of the supplier's random yield on supply chain members' decision‐making. This paper investigates a two‐stage optimization problem within a two‐echelon supply chain, featuring a supplier with random yield and a retailer updating demand information in real‐time. Faced with a long production lead time, the retailer can either place advance orders at the production season's onset (first‐stage advance order) or opt for instant orders at the beginning of the sales season (second‐stage instant order). To ensure timely order fulfillment, the supplier initially employs a cost‐effective regular production mode with random yield during the production season. If yields are insufficient during sales, a pricier emergency production mode with guaranteed output becomes available. Utilizing a dynamic programming approach, we formulate the two‐stage optimization problem to derive optimal production and order decisions. Our analysis uncovers how realized random yield and stochastic market signals influence emergency production and instant order quantities in the second stage. We compare expected profits in scenarios with perfect and imperfect market signals, probing the members' preferences regarding order strategies. An intriguing finding emerges: as instant wholesale prices rising, the supplier's preferred order strategy diverges from the retailer. By strategic adjustments to the instant wholesale price, we demonstrate the potential for unanimous agreement on preferred order strategies among supply chain members — a quality enhancing the chain's flexibility and performance. Moreover, we extend the model to hybrid order strategies and identify conditions for unanimous preference among the three strategies. To bolster our theoretical findings, we provide numerical examples, lending practical support to our study.
{"title":"The evolution of two‐stage production and order equilibrium in a random yield supply chain with demand information updating","authors":"Jiawu Peng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4384","url":null,"abstract":"The mismatch between production, order, and demand seriously affects supply chain performance. However, most research focus on the mismatch between the retailer's order and customer's demand, which ignores the influence of the supplier's random yield on supply chain members' decision‐making. This paper investigates a two‐stage optimization problem within a two‐echelon supply chain, featuring a supplier with random yield and a retailer updating demand information in real‐time. Faced with a long production lead time, the retailer can either place advance orders at the production season's onset (first‐stage advance order) or opt for instant orders at the beginning of the sales season (second‐stage instant order). To ensure timely order fulfillment, the supplier initially employs a cost‐effective regular production mode with random yield during the production season. If yields are insufficient during sales, a pricier emergency production mode with guaranteed output becomes available. Utilizing a dynamic programming approach, we formulate the two‐stage optimization problem to derive optimal production and order decisions. Our analysis uncovers how realized random yield and stochastic market signals influence emergency production and instant order quantities in the second stage. We compare expected profits in scenarios with perfect and imperfect market signals, probing the members' preferences regarding order strategies. An intriguing finding emerges: as instant wholesale prices rising, the supplier's preferred order strategy diverges from the retailer. By strategic adjustments to the instant wholesale price, we demonstrate the potential for unanimous agreement on preferred order strategies among supply chain members — a quality enhancing the chain's flexibility and performance. Moreover, we extend the model to hybrid order strategies and identify conditions for unanimous preference among the three strategies. To bolster our theoretical findings, we provide numerical examples, lending practical support to our study.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142260269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zhihui Li, Yuanyuan Jiao, Yangyang Cheng, Zhifeng Shen, Mi Zhou
New product diffusion relies heavily on interpersonal relationships, yet the adoption chasm between the early adopters and the early majority poses a significant challenge. The pervasiveness of peer influence in social networks presents unique opportunities for businesses to effectively bridge this chasm between user groups. This study, grounded in social–psychological theory, examines the micro‐processes of early adopters' peer influence on the early majority within social networks. Utilizing the stimulus–organism–response model, we propose that early adopter peer influence can enhance early majority adoption intention, thereby crossing the chasm of new product diffusion. Empirical findings reveal that early adopters' peer influence, directly and indirectly, affects the early majority's adoption decisions. When indirect effects are at play, the early majority emphasizes the emotional and social values embedded within the new product, driven by the early adopters' peer influence. These insights contribute to understanding how interactions between user types can help bridge the adoption chasm. The study augments, refines, and expands upon existing research on new product diffusion chasms and offers valuable practical guidance for businesses seeking to harness peer influence more effectively to overcome this barrier.
{"title":"Unlocking the power of peer influence: Strategies for bridging the adoption chasm in new product diffusion","authors":"Zhihui Li, Yuanyuan Jiao, Yangyang Cheng, Zhifeng Shen, Mi Zhou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4379","url":null,"abstract":"New product diffusion relies heavily on interpersonal relationships, yet the adoption chasm between the early adopters and the early majority poses a significant challenge. The pervasiveness of peer influence in social networks presents unique opportunities for businesses to effectively bridge this chasm between user groups. This study, grounded in social–psychological theory, examines the micro‐processes of early adopters' peer influence on the early majority within social networks. Utilizing the stimulus–organism–response model, we propose that early adopter peer influence can enhance early majority adoption intention, thereby crossing the chasm of new product diffusion. Empirical findings reveal that early adopters' peer influence, directly and indirectly, affects the early majority's adoption decisions. When indirect effects are at play, the early majority emphasizes the emotional and social values embedded within the new product, driven by the early adopters' peer influence. These insights contribute to understanding how interactions between user types can help bridge the adoption chasm. The study augments, refines, and expands upon existing research on new product diffusion chasms and offers valuable practical guidance for businesses seeking to harness peer influence more effectively to overcome this barrier.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142260270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines a manufacturer selling directly to customers has three modes for acquiring end‐of‐life vehicles with a key component supplier: supplier‐collection, manufacturer‐collection, and third‐party‐collection modes. We find that the supplier, who is farther away from customers, is the optimal agent to be responsible for recovery activity. Following, we design a simple transfer price contract for the supplier‐collection mode such that the recovery rate achieves the centralized level. Subsequently, a fixed payment is proposed to compensate the supplier, thereby realizing Pareto improvement. Finally, we consider the supplier as the Stackelberg leader and find opposite results regarding optimal reverse channel structure.
{"title":"Optimal reverse channel for end‐of‐life vehicle closed‐loop supply chains","authors":"Junfei Ding, Wen Zhang, Xujin Pu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4389","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines a manufacturer selling directly to customers has three modes for acquiring end‐of‐life vehicles with a key component supplier: supplier‐collection, manufacturer‐collection, and third‐party‐collection modes. We find that the supplier, who is farther away from customers, is the optimal agent to be responsible for recovery activity. Following, we design a simple transfer price contract for the supplier‐collection mode such that the recovery rate achieves the centralized level. Subsequently, a fixed payment is proposed to compensate the supplier, thereby realizing Pareto improvement. Finally, we consider the supplier as the Stackelberg leader and find opposite results regarding optimal reverse channel structure.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper focuses on the implementation of “C‐ROSS II” and utilizes an evolutionary game model to investigate regulatory issues. Based on prospect theory, a three‐party evolutionary game model is constructed among regulatory agencies, insurance companies, and consumers with incomplete rationality, examining evolutionary stability strategies. Meanwhile, considering the different attitudes of policyholders in the face of loss and return, the heterogeneous risk preference is analyzed by changing the prospect parameters. The results show that increases in penalty amounts, positive incentives, and consumer sensitivity to losses will promote the evolution of the system to the optimal stable equilibrium point. However, rises in brand incomes and rectification costs, as well as decreases in capital costs, will decrease the probability of regulatory authorities enforcing strict supervision.
本文以 "C-ROSS II "的实施为重点，利用进化博弈模型研究监管问题。以前景理论为基础，构建了监管机构、保险公司和具有不完全理性的消费者之间的三方演化博弈模型，研究了演化稳定策略。同时，考虑到投保人面对损失和收益的不同态度，通过改变前景参数分析了异质性风险偏好。结果表明，增加惩罚金额、正向激励和消费者对损失的敏感性将促进系统向最优稳定均衡点演化。然而，品牌收入和整改成本的增加以及资本成本的减少会降低监管当局实施严格监管的概率。
{"title":"Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation of solvency supervision under C‐ROSS II based on prospect theory","authors":"Shilong Li, Zhijie Tong","doi":"10.1002/mde.4388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4388","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the implementation of “C‐ROSS II” and utilizes an evolutionary game model to investigate regulatory issues. Based on prospect theory, a three‐party evolutionary game model is constructed among regulatory agencies, insurance companies, and consumers with incomplete rationality, examining evolutionary stability strategies. Meanwhile, considering the different attitudes of policyholders in the face of loss and return, the heterogeneous risk preference is analyzed by changing the prospect parameters. The results show that increases in penalty amounts, positive incentives, and consumer sensitivity to losses will promote the evolution of the system to the optimal stable equilibrium point. However, rises in brand incomes and rectification costs, as well as decreases in capital costs, will decrease the probability of regulatory authorities enforcing strict supervision.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kingsley I. Okere, Stephen Kelechi Dimnwobi, Ismail O. Fasanya
The adoption and utilization of renewable energy offer potential benefits such as enhanced energy efficiency, cost savings, and ecological advantages. However, a key research question addressed in this analysis is whether natural resource rent and employment dynamics influence renewable energy consumption in Africa. Previous research has predominantly focused on the aggregate employment rate, overlooking the nuances of labor diversity across sectors and employment types. Hence, this study evaluates the importance of natural resource rent and employment in driving the transition to green energy in sub‐Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2022. It employs the innovative method of moments quantile regression (MMQR) model for this purpose. The findings reveal a positive connection between natural resource rent and the adoption of green energy. When considering employment types, the study observes that self‐employment and wages/salaried workers undermine clean energy utilization. Moreover, the study highlights that employment across key economic sectors also plays a role. While employment in the agriculture and service sectors fosters green energy utilization, employment in the industrial sector impedes renewable energy consumption. To advance the development of green energy in Africa, this study underscores a range of policy options.
{"title":"Striding towards a greener future: Unlocking the potential of natural resources and employment dynamics in green energy transition in sub‐Saharan Africa","authors":"Kingsley I. Okere, Stephen Kelechi Dimnwobi, Ismail O. Fasanya","doi":"10.1002/mde.4377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4377","url":null,"abstract":"The adoption and utilization of renewable energy offer potential benefits such as enhanced energy efficiency, cost savings, and ecological advantages. However, a key research question addressed in this analysis is whether natural resource rent and employment dynamics influence renewable energy consumption in Africa. Previous research has predominantly focused on the aggregate employment rate, overlooking the nuances of labor diversity across sectors and employment types. Hence, this study evaluates the importance of natural resource rent and employment in driving the transition to green energy in sub‐Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2022. It employs the innovative method of moments quantile regression (MMQR) model for this purpose. The findings reveal a positive connection between natural resource rent and the adoption of green energy. When considering employment types, the study observes that self‐employment and wages/salaried workers undermine clean energy utilization. Moreover, the study highlights that employment across key economic sectors also plays a role. While employment in the agriculture and service sectors fosters green energy utilization, employment in the industrial sector impedes renewable energy consumption. To advance the development of green energy in Africa, this study underscores a range of policy options.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding the mechanism of asset bubble formation is important for maintaining financial stability and healthy functioning of the economic system. With gradual emphasis on the complex characteristics of financial markets, a new perspective for analyzing the emergence of asset bubbles is emerging: how to integrate the real economy with financial markets composed of heterogeneous individuals. In this study, we propose a two‐layer network game to investigate the impact of financial contagion between the real and financial sectors on asset bubbles. Among their interactions, shadow banking activities in both sectors increase the contagion risk across financial markets and construct a broader financial system. Both credit interactions and peer learning effects are captured in the network framework. Simulating relevant regulation policies, our experiments indicate that regulators should closely monitor returns on assets by setting an upper threshold. Financialization in the real sector significantly exacerbates the formation of asset bubbles, with medium‐level borrowing constraints minimizing bubble dynamics most effectively. The financialization practices of mature industries should be strictly regulated, while innovative industries should be allowed moderately flexible financing practices. The degree of friction within the financial market should be flexibly calibrated for financial institutions and genuine enterprises, aiming to mitigate systemic risks in the financial market while fostering robust growth in the real economy.
{"title":"Effect of financial contagion between real and financial sectors on asset bubbles: A two‐layer network game approach","authors":"Ruguo Fan, Xiao Xie, Yuanyuan Wang, Jinchai Lin","doi":"10.1002/mde.4381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4381","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the mechanism of asset bubble formation is important for maintaining financial stability and healthy functioning of the economic system. With gradual emphasis on the complex characteristics of financial markets, a new perspective for analyzing the emergence of asset bubbles is emerging: how to integrate the real economy with financial markets composed of heterogeneous individuals. In this study, we propose a two‐layer network game to investigate the impact of financial contagion between the real and financial sectors on asset bubbles. Among their interactions, shadow banking activities in both sectors increase the contagion risk across financial markets and construct a broader financial system. Both credit interactions and peer learning effects are captured in the network framework. Simulating relevant regulation policies, our experiments indicate that regulators should closely monitor returns on assets by setting an upper threshold. Financialization in the real sector significantly exacerbates the formation of asset bubbles, with medium‐level borrowing constraints minimizing bubble dynamics most effectively. The financialization practices of mature industries should be strictly regulated, while innovative industries should be allowed moderately flexible financing practices. The degree of friction within the financial market should be flexibly calibrated for financial institutions and genuine enterprises, aiming to mitigate systemic risks in the financial market while fostering robust growth in the real economy.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Neng Shen, Jing Zhang, Yang Chun Cao, Lin Zhang, Guoping Zhang
Approaches to stimulating the initiative of collaborative cooperation of multiple subjects and the enthusiasm of public–private collaborative supervision are important to ensure the high‐quality development of the social public health system. This study constructs a four‐agent evolutionary game model with a medical enterprise, health administrative department, medical institution, and the social public as the core subjects. Using MATLAB 2018b to conduct simulation analysis, the cooperation strategy and operation mechanism of multiple subjects in the social public health system under public–private collaborative supervision are revealed, and the evolutionary stability strategy of multiple subjects under different situations is further explored. The results show (1) three evolutionary stability points in the system, which all exist in a state of loose government supervision. (2) Increasing the penalty limit can effectively regulate the behavior of medical enterprises and medical institutions; however, it is not conducive to the performance efficiency of the government in the long run. (3) Government incentives can stimulate the enthusiasm of all subjects to participate in the social public health system but should be controlled within a reasonable range. Excessive financial incentives make it easy for medical enterprises and institutions to form policy dependence.
{"title":"Clear the fog: Can public–private collaborative supervision promote the construction of a high‐quality public health system?","authors":"Neng Shen, Jing Zhang, Yang Chun Cao, Lin Zhang, Guoping Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4349","url":null,"abstract":"Approaches to stimulating the initiative of collaborative cooperation of multiple subjects and the enthusiasm of public–private collaborative supervision are important to ensure the high‐quality development of the social public health system. This study constructs a four‐agent evolutionary game model with a medical enterprise, health administrative department, medical institution, and the social public as the core subjects. Using MATLAB 2018b to conduct simulation analysis, the cooperation strategy and operation mechanism of multiple subjects in the social public health system under public–private collaborative supervision are revealed, and the evolutionary stability strategy of multiple subjects under different situations is further explored. The results show (1) three evolutionary stability points in the system, which all exist in a state of loose government supervision. (2) Increasing the penalty limit can effectively regulate the behavior of medical enterprises and medical institutions; however, it is not conducive to the performance efficiency of the government in the long run. (3) Government incentives can stimulate the enthusiasm of all subjects to participate in the social public health system but should be controlled within a reasonable range. Excessive financial incentives make it easy for medical enterprises and institutions to form policy dependence.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yong Sun, Xinqi Yang, Runtian Wu, Guangxiang Gong, Tianjie Lei
Falsification of carbon emissions data poses a significant challenge to the integrity of the carbon trading market. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive strategy involving various stakeholders. This paper focuses on collusive behavior in carbon emissions data falsification. An evolutionary game model is established to illustrate the interactions between local governments, carbon‐emitting enterprises, and third‐party carbon verification agencies. The stability of the evolutionary game and its conditions are analyzed, revealing the impact of regulatory penalties, credit losses, and awareness of responsibility. This study proposes a management framework tailored for this tripartite game, providing valuable insights for policy formulation.
{"title":"How to address enterprise collusion in falsifying carbon emission data: A game theory analysis","authors":"Yong Sun, Xinqi Yang, Runtian Wu, Guangxiang Gong, Tianjie Lei","doi":"10.1002/mde.4380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4380","url":null,"abstract":"Falsification of carbon emissions data poses a significant challenge to the integrity of the carbon trading market. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive strategy involving various stakeholders. This paper focuses on collusive behavior in carbon emissions data falsification. An evolutionary game model is established to illustrate the interactions between local governments, carbon‐emitting enterprises, and third‐party carbon verification agencies. The stability of the evolutionary game and its conditions are analyzed, revealing the impact of regulatory penalties, credit losses, and awareness of responsibility. This study proposes a management framework tailored for this tripartite game, providing valuable insights for policy formulation.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study discusses the cannibalization strategy of an outside manufacturer. A game‐theoretic model is developed in which manufacturers sell low‐quality products through retailers. The external manufacturer chooses between the retailer channel and the direct sales channel when considering carbon differences. The results show that carbon differentials and direct marketing costs play a key role in the choice of cannibalization strategy. Cannibalization by external manufacturers through retailers is not necessarily harmful to existing manufacturers. An increase in the degree of carbon differentiation leads to a decrease in wholesale and retail prices, while direct pricing by external manufacturers increases.
{"title":"Carbon differentials and dual channels: The choice and impact of optimal strategies for manufacturer market encroachment","authors":"Yan Tang, Yunpei Cheng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4378","url":null,"abstract":"This study discusses the cannibalization strategy of an outside manufacturer. A game‐theoretic model is developed in which manufacturers sell low‐quality products through retailers. The external manufacturer chooses between the retailer channel and the direct sales channel when considering carbon differences. The results show that carbon differentials and direct marketing costs play a key role in the choice of cannibalization strategy. Cannibalization by external manufacturers through retailers is not necessarily harmful to existing manufacturers. An increase in the degree of carbon differentiation leads to a decrease in wholesale and retail prices, while direct pricing by external manufacturers increases.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yang Xia, Yang Hui, Huang Hongfu, Zhu Siyuan, Yu Qingling
Given that the impact of consumers' environmental awareness and government subsidies on retailer sourcing has not been adequately examined in previous research, our study examines the impact of government subsidies on a retailer's low‐carbon sourcing strategies. We define a parameter that characterizes the efficiency of government subsidies and build a game theoretical model that includes an ordinary supplier, a low‐carbon supplier, and a retailer. The retailer's sourcing strategies include three options: only ordinary products (O), only low‐carbon products (L), and both ordinary and low‐carbon products (D). Our analysis shows the following results: First, when the retailer's environmental awareness exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer sources either low‐carbon products or a combination of ordinary and low‐carbon products. Otherwise, the retailer sources both ordinary and low‐carbon products. Second, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively high, the government adopts a nonsubsidy policy regardless of the product's abatement level. However, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively low, the government's policy depends on the abatement level of the product: It provides a subsidy if the abatement level is low and no subsidy if the abatement level is high. Third, government subsidies to the retailer are not always an effective means of increasing social welfare. Our results have important implications for the design of effective government subsidy policies.
{"title":"Low‐carbon supplier selection in the presence of government subsidy","authors":"Yang Xia, Yang Hui, Huang Hongfu, Zhu Siyuan, Yu Qingling","doi":"10.1002/mde.4368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4368","url":null,"abstract":"Given that the impact of consumers' environmental awareness and government subsidies on retailer sourcing has not been adequately examined in previous research, our study examines the impact of government subsidies on a retailer's low‐carbon sourcing strategies. We define a parameter that characterizes the efficiency of government subsidies and build a game theoretical model that includes an ordinary supplier, a low‐carbon supplier, and a retailer. The retailer's sourcing strategies include three options: only ordinary products (O), only low‐carbon products (L), and both ordinary and low‐carbon products (D). Our analysis shows the following results: First, when the retailer's environmental awareness exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer sources either low‐carbon products or a combination of ordinary and low‐carbon products. Otherwise, the retailer sources both ordinary and low‐carbon products. Second, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively high, the government adopts a nonsubsidy policy regardless of the product's abatement level. However, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively low, the government's policy depends on the abatement level of the product: It provides a subsidy if the abatement level is low and no subsidy if the abatement level is high. Third, government subsidies to the retailer are not always an effective means of increasing social welfare. Our results have important implications for the design of effective government subsidy policies.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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