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Agency mode selection and software competition in supply chains 供应链中的代理模式选择和软件竞争
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4385
Tinghai Ren, Nengmin Zeng, Dafei Wang, Kaifu Yuan

At present, many software developers work with downstream service providers to sell software and services. For political or economic reasons, foreign developers may be not allowed to sell software and services directly in the country of providers, but they can authorize their software to the providers for sale. In this study, we examine two types of IT supply chain (ITSC), namely, “Agenting Domestic Software” (Mode 1) and “Agenting Foreign Software” (Mode 2), each with a domestic developer/a foreign developer, a service provider, and client enterprises. In both modes, clients can either pay a high price to purchase software with accessorial pre-sale service from the provider, or firsthand acquire it from the domestic developer at a low price but without pre-sale service. We observe that in Mode 1, the domestic developer's market scale and the competition intensity of software have no effect on the domestic developer's decisions and profit; however, they have influences on the provider's decisions and profit. In Mode 2, the profits of ITSC members may increase with the intensity of software competition. When the domestic developer's market scale is small (large), and the domestic developer has (loses) the advantage of low extended-warranty-service (EWS) cost, Mode 1 (2) is more beneficial to the domestic developer than Mode 2 (1); however, the provider is more willing to choose Mode 2 (Mode 1). In other cases, either Mode 1 or Mode 2 may result in a win-win situation for the domestic developer and provider.

目前,许多软件开发人员与下游服务提供商合作销售软件和服务。出于政治或经济原因,外国开发商可能不被允许直接在提供商的国家销售软件和服务,但他们可以授权他们的软件给提供商销售。在本研究中,我们研究了两种类型的IT供应链(ITSC),即“代理国内软件”(模式1)和“代理国外软件”(模式2),每一种都有一个国内开发商/外国开发商,一个服务提供商和客户企业。在这两种模式下,客户都可以以高价从供应商处购买附带售前服务的软件,或者以低价从国内开发商处直接获得软件,但不提供售前服务。我们观察到,在模式1中,国内开发商的市场规模和软件竞争强度对国内开发商的决策和利润没有影响;然而,他们对供应商的决策和利润有影响。在模式2中,ITSC成员的利润可能随着软件竞争的激烈程度而增加。当国内开发商的市场规模较小(较大),且国内开发商拥有(失去)较低的延保成本优势时,模式1(2)比模式2(1)更有利于国内开发商;但是,提供商更愿意选择模式2(模式1)。在其他情况下,模式1或模式2都可能导致国内开发商和提供商的双赢。
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引用次数: 0
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and market quality in emerging economies 反海外腐败法》(FCPA)与新兴经济体的市场质量
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4399
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Makoto Yano

In many emerging economies with antiquated laws, bribes paid to government officials reduce economic impediments and serve as a device to improve market competition, thereby contributing to the modernization of an economy. In this context, this paper uses a simple two-stage game theoretic model to investigate the effects of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) on such economies. We demonstrate, among others, that while an increase in fines under FCPA reduces overall corruption, it leads to a deterioration in the market quality in an emerging economy. In the presence of FCPA, an increase in the US firm's technological advantage unambiguously leads to a decrease in the market quality in an emerging economy.

在许多法律陈旧的新兴经济体中,向政府官员行贿减少了经济障碍,并成为改善市场竞争的一种手段,从而有助于经济的现代化。在此背景下,本文使用一个简单的两阶段博弈论模型来研究美国《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)对这些经济体的影响。除其他外,我们证明,尽管根据《反海外腐败法》增加罚款可以减少总体腐败,但它会导致新兴经济体的市场质量恶化。在FCPA存在的情况下,美国公司技术优势的增加无疑会导致新兴经济体市场质量的下降。
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引用次数: 0
Retailer information sharing under manufacturer encroachment and production cost reduction 厂商侵占下的零售商信息共享与降低生产成本
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4395
Zhibao Li, Beifen Wang

This study investigates retailer's sharing decisions concerning ex ante information about demand when the encroaching manufacturer can reduce production cost. Equilibrium information sharing decisions with encroachment are quite different from that with no encroachment. The encroaching manufacturer's cost reduction efficiency is key to determine equilibrium results, and these thresholds regarding cost reduction efficiency depend on competition intensity between the encroaching manufacturer's direct channel and retailer channel. Furthermore, through investigating the encroachment decisions of the manufacturer, we prove that the equilibrium information sharing decisions under encroachment is robust in general.

本研究探讨了当制造商的入侵可以降低生产成本时,零售商的事前需求资讯共享决策。有侵犯的均衡信息共享决策与无侵犯的均衡信息共享决策有很大不同。入侵厂商的成本降低效率是决定均衡结果的关键,而成本降低效率的阈值取决于入侵厂商直销渠道与零售商渠道之间的竞争强度。此外,通过研究制造商的入侵决策,我们证明了在入侵下的均衡信息共享决策一般是鲁棒的。
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引用次数: 0
Behavior in long-run projects and elicited time preferences 长期项目中的行为和激发的时间偏好
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4396
Zafer Akin, Abdullah Yavaş

We investigate behavior in long-run projects and its relationship with experimentally elicited time preferences. Participants engage in a longitudinal project requiring sustained real effort, with their time preferences estimated through monetary outcomes. We observe a tendency to front-load real effort, with choices reflecting both present and future bias, the former being more prevalent and severe. We also find evidence of naive choice reversals. However, there is no support for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model in monetary choices, and its predictions do not align with real effort allocation patterns. Nevertheless, discount rate and present bias parameters derived from monetary outcomes demonstrate predictive power over real effort allocation.

我们研究长期项目中的行为及其与实验引发的时间偏好的关系。参与者参与一个纵向项目,需要持续的实际努力,他们的时间偏好通过金钱结果来估计。我们观察到一种预先投入实际努力的趋势,选择同时反映了当前和未来的偏见,前者更为普遍和严重。我们还发现了幼稚选择逆转的证据。然而,在货币选择中没有准双曲贴现模型的支持,其预测与实际的努力分配模式不一致。然而,从货币结果中得出的贴现率和当前偏差参数显示出对实际努力分配的预测能力。
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引用次数: 0
A configuration analysis of the driving path of corporate physical investments: Necessary condition analysis and qualitative comparative analysis based on fuzzy sets 企业实物投资驱动路径的配置分析:必要条件分析与基于模糊集的定性比较分析
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4397
Zhen Wang, Hongyan Zhao

Corporate physical investments are an important foundation for sustainable economic development. This study investigates the causal relationships and complex mechanisms of the five antecedent conditions under the “Merger–Organization–Environment” (MOE) framework with corporate physical investments. These antecedent conditions include green mergers and acquisitions (M&A), financing constraints, main business performance, corporate governance capacities, and government environmental concerns. Combining the necessary condition analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, a sample of 40 heavily polluting listed enterprises in China's A-share market from 2016 to 2020 is used. The results found that (1) individual antecedent conditions do not constitute the necessary conditions for corporate physical investments; (2) there are four configurations that generate high corporate physical investments, i.e., proactive change-oriented type, main business focus-oriented type, performance-driven oriented type, and passive change-oriented type; and (3) there are four configurations that generate non-high corporate physical investments, i.e., performance-bound type, funding-bound type, M&A-bound type, and strategically bound type. This demonstrates the asymmetry of the configurations that generate high and non-high corporate physical investments, which helps to formulate incentives for corporate physical investments from multiple perspectives.

企业实物投资是经济可持续发展的重要基础。本研究探讨了“并购-组织-环境”(MOE)框架下五种前因条件与企业实物投资的因果关系及其复杂机制。这些先决条件包括绿色并购、融资约束、主营业务绩效、公司治理能力和政府对环境的关注。结合必要条件分析和模糊集定性比较分析,以2016 - 2020年中国a股市场40家重污染上市企业为样本。研究发现:(1)个体先行条件不构成企业实物投资的必要条件;(2)企业实体投资高的配置有主动型变革型、主业主导型、绩效驱动型和被动变革型四种;(3)产生非高企业实物投资的配置有四种,即绩效约束型、资金约束型、并购约束型和战略约束型。这证明了产生高和非高企业实物投资的配置的不对称性,有助于从多个角度制定企业实物投资的激励措施。
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引用次数: 0
Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints 家族董事会席位的过度控制和企业融资约束
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4367
Yuqi Yang, Tianle Meng

We examine the relationship between excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) and financing constraints (FCs) using 2008–2021 data for listed family firms in China. We find that ECFBS intensifies Type II agency problems, thereby worsens corporate FCs. We also investigate the impact of family firm founder characteristics, family owner characteristics, and external shareholder equity structure on the ECFBS and FCs. Our findings provide evidence of the encroachment effect of family control.

本文利用2008-2021年中国上市家族企业的数据,研究了家族董事会席位控制权过剩(ECFBS)与融资约束(fc)之间的关系。我们发现ECFBS加剧了第二类代理问题,从而恶化了公司的财务状况。我们还研究了家族企业创始人特征、家族所有者特征和外部股东股权结构对企业财务稳定性和财务稳定性的影响。我们的研究结果为家庭控制的侵蚀效应提供了证据。
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引用次数: 0
Financial hedging incentive contracts in global supply chains: A distributionally robust approach 全球供应链中的金融对冲激励合同:分布稳健的方法
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4398
Xiaoyi Li, Hui Yu, Caihong Sun

This paper developed a global supply chain with a supplier and a retailer in different countries. When exchange rate and demand risks are concentrated in retailer, a distributionally robust approach is used to formulate an optimized robust ordering strategy. Furthermore, the effect of financial hedging incentive contracts on the robust decisions and the profits of the global supply chain is explored. Our findings show that the correlation between exchange rate and demand does not affect the robust decisions of retailer. The effectiveness of financial hedging incentive contracts depends on the trade-off between transaction costs of financial hedging and the degree of supplier incentives and the growth rate of order quantity.

本文开发了一个全球供应链,在不同的国家有一个供应商和一个零售商。当汇率风险和需求风险集中在零售商身上时,采用分布鲁棒性方法制定了优化的鲁棒订购策略。进一步探讨了金融套期保值激励契约对全球供应链稳健决策和利润的影响。我们的研究结果表明,汇率与需求之间的相关性并不影响零售商的稳健决策。金融套期激励契约的有效性取决于金融套期交易成本与供应商激励程度和订单数量增长率之间的权衡。
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引用次数: 0
Optimal financing strategies for low-carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective 低碳供应链的最优融资策略:基于Stackelberg博弈的视角
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4394
Lei Wang, Lin Zhang, Xiaoli Zhang

This study constructs a Stackelberg game model between low-carbon manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers. Considering the manufacturer's financing model, the manufacturer's investment model, and the internal blended financing model, it studies the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers. This paper investigates the impact of consumers' low-carbon preference, the financing interest rate of manufacturers, investment ratio, investment return on carbon emission reduction investment, and supply chain pricing. The conditions for low-carbon supply chain participants to choose the best financing mode and the impact of different financing models on the performance of low-carbon supply chains were obtained.

本文构建了低碳制造商与资本受限零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型。考虑制造商融资模式、制造商投资模式和内部混合融资模式,研究了制造商的最优批发价格。本文考察了消费者低碳偏好、制造商融资利率、投资比例、碳减排投资回报、供应链定价等因素的影响。获得了低碳供应链参与者选择最佳融资模式的条件,以及不同融资模式对低碳供应链绩效的影响。
{"title":"Optimal financing strategies for low-carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective","authors":"Lei Wang,&nbsp;Lin Zhang,&nbsp;Xiaoli Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study constructs a Stackelberg game model between low-carbon manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers. Considering the manufacturer's financing model, the manufacturer's investment model, and the internal blended financing model, it studies the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers. This paper investigates the impact of consumers' low-carbon preference, the financing interest rate of manufacturers, investment ratio, investment return on carbon emission reduction investment, and supply chain pricing. The conditions for low-carbon supply chain participants to choose the best financing mode and the impact of different financing models on the performance of low-carbon supply chains were obtained.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"666-680"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142859897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Towards sustainable development: Institutions, perceptions, and innovation 迈向可持续发展:制度、观念和创新
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4391
Xiaoyang Zhao, Dangdang Cui, Chante Jian Ding

This study investigates the influence of the exogenous event of Chinese GIS (Government Inspection Supervision) on corporate environmental innovation. GIS significantly enhances green innovation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. Moreover, executives' green perception significantly and positively moderates the constructive association between GIS and green innovation in SOEs. Additional analysis shows that inspection supervision encourages green innovation in SOEs by easing financial restrictions and boosting R&D spending. This effect is more prominent in areas where the intensity of government pollution source regulation is weaker and in enterprises with poorer performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our research supports the conjecture that national governance can be a crucial determinant of green innovation, providing a valuable reference for accelerating China's green growth process and expanding the research perspective for the construction of governance systems in developing countries.

本文研究了中国GIS外生事件对企业环境创新的影响。根据差分估计,GIS显著促进了国有企业的绿色创新。此外,高管的绿色感知显著正向调节了GIS与国有企业绿色创新之间的建设性关联。另外的分析表明,检查监督通过放松财务限制和增加研发支出来鼓励国有企业的绿色创新。这种效应在政府污染源监管力度较弱的地区和企业社会责任绩效较差的企业中更为突出。我们的研究支持了国家治理是绿色创新关键决定因素的猜想,为加快中国绿色增长进程和拓展发展中国家治理体系建设的研究视角提供了有价值的参考。
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引用次数: 0
Navigating legal responsibilities in politically connected firms: Insights into the influence of directors' and officers' insurance on litigation risk 在政治关联公司中履行法律责任:董事和高管保险对诉讼风险影响的启示
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4390
Xiaojuan Zhang, Yizhen Guo, Tiancheng Chi

This study aims to investigate how directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance, legal responsibilities, and firm political connections collectively influence corporate litigation risk. D&O insurance is common, but its effectiveness in limiting litigation risk in diverse legal and political circumstances is questionable. The study employs a quantitative research approach, utilizing regression analysis and moderation techniques. Data are collected from a diverse sample of 411 individuals comprising directors, legal experts, government regulators, public company staff, and insurance providers. Regression models explore the relationships between D&O insurance, legal responsibilities, political connections, and corporate litigation risk. The findings provide practical insights for stakeholders in corporate governance, informing strategies to enhance risk management and compliance frameworks. This study contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining the comprehensive influence of D&O insurance, legal responsibilities, and political connections on corporate litigation risk. It integrates multiple variables and moderating effects to offer a nuanced understanding of corporate governance dynamics. Strategic adoption of D&O insurance can effectively mitigate litigation risks associated with legal responsibilities, although caution is warranted regarding the exacerbating effects of firm political connections. By understanding these dynamics, firms can proactively enhance their governance practices and adapt to regulatory changes, thereby improving overall corporate resilience and sustainability.

本研究旨在探讨董事及高管(D&O)责任保险、法律责任和公司政治关系如何共同影响公司诉讼风险。D&O 保险很常见,但在不同的法律和政治环境下,它在限制诉讼风险方面的有效性值得怀疑。本研究采用定量研究方法,利用回归分析和调节技术。数据来自 411 个不同的样本,包括董事、法律专家、政府监管者、上市公司员工和保险供应商。回归模型探讨了 D&O 保险、法律责任、政治关系和公司诉讼风险之间的关系。研究结果为公司治理中的利益相关者提供了实用的见解,为加强风险管理和合规框架的战略提供了参考。本研究通过实证研究 D&O 保险、法律责任和政治关系对企业诉讼风险的综合影响,为现有文献做出了贡献。它整合了多个变量和调节效应,为公司治理动态提供了细致入微的理解。战略性地采用 D&O 保险可以有效降低与法律责任相关的诉讼风险,但需要警惕公司政治关系的加剧效应。通过了解这些动态变化,企业可以积极主动地加强治理实践,适应监管变化,从而提高企业的整体应变能力和可持续性。
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引用次数: 0
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Managerial and Decision Economics
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