Decision-making in low carbon supply chains: A blockchain-based LCSP perspective and a differential game model

Yingying Xu, Zhenni Zhang
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Abstract

Blockchain technology has reshaped how members of supply chains transfer information, effectively avoiding the phenomenon of information silos and helping to improve the emissions reduction performance and profit of each subject in the supply chain. It is now critical to understand how supply chain members can be encouraged to collaboratively invest in low-carbon service platforms based on blockchain technology to realise chain-wide systematic carbon reduction. In this regard, considering the time-dynamic characteristics of enterprise emissions reduction, this paper establishes a differential game model of collaborative emissions reduction in a low-carbon supply chain composed of a Stackelberg leader manufacturer and a supplier. We compare and analyse the four investment decision scenarios regarding whether the supplier and manufacturer invest in the blockchain low-carbon service platform under decentralised decision-making, as well as the equilibrium solutions of supply chain members under centralised decision-making scenarios by solving the Hamilton function. Finally, we introduce a bilateral cost-sharing contract to make the supply chain perfectly coordinated. We find that the significant unit return is an important incentive for supply chain members to take the lead in investing in a low carbon service platform (LCSP). In this regard, when only one member invests, the other one demonstrates free-riding behaviour. Under centralised decision-making, the supply chain can achieve Pareto optimality, and the bilateral cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain, which is the best choice for the decision-makers of low-carbon supply chains. As the influence level of the LCSP gradually increases from small to large, the optimal decision-making of supply chain members gradually transitions from waiting for the right time to ‘hitchhike’ to a strong willingness to cooperate. This study is of great reference value and practical significance for economic entities to improve profits, promote systematic carbon reduction in the whole chain and promote the sustainable development of low-carbon supply chains.
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低碳供应链中的决策制定:基于区块链的低碳供应链视角和差异博弈模型
区块链技术重塑了供应链成员的信息传递方式,有效避免了信息孤岛现象,有助于提高供应链中各主体的减排绩效和利润。目前,关键是要了解如何鼓励供应链成员协同投资基于区块链技术的低碳服务平台,实现全链条的系统性碳减排。为此,考虑到企业减排的时间动态特征,本文建立了一个由斯泰克尔伯格领导者制造商和供应商组成的低碳供应链协同减排的差异博弈模型。通过求解汉密尔顿函数,比较分析了分散决策下供应商和制造商是否投资区块链低碳服务平台的四种投资决策情景,以及集中决策情景下供应链成员的均衡解。最后,我们引入双边成本分摊合约,使供应链完美协调。我们发现,可观的单位回报是激励供应链成员率先投资低碳服务平台(LCSP)的重要因素。在这方面,当只有一个成员投资时,另一个成员就会表现出搭便车的行为。在集中决策下,供应链可以实现帕累托最优,双边成本分摊契约可以实现供应链的完美协调,是低碳供应链决策者的最佳选择。随着低碳供应链的影响程度由小到大逐步提高,供应链成员的最优决策也由等待时机 "搭便车 "逐步过渡到合作意愿强烈。本研究对经济实体提高利润、促进全链系统性减碳、推动低碳供应链可持续发展具有重要的参考价值和现实意义。
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