Epictetusian rationality and evolutionary stability

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Evolutionary Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI:10.1007/s00191-024-00864-8
Gregory Ponthiere
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Abstract

An economic interpretation of Epictetus’s precept of ‘Taking away aversion from all things not in our power’ consists of extending the symmetric factor of the preference relation beyond its boundaries under non-ethical preferences, so as to yield indifference between outcomes differing only on things outside one’s control. This paper examines the evolutionary dynamics of a population composed of Nash agents and Epictetusian agents matched randomly and interacting in the prisoner’s dilemma game. It is shown that when the evolutionary dynamics is driven by material pay-offs, the Nash type is an ESS under perfect random matching, whereas either the Nash or the Epictetusian type can be an ESS under imperfect random matching. However, when selection is driven by utility pay-offs, the Nash type can never be an ESS, and the Epictetusian type is an ESS if the matching process exhibits a sufficiently high degree of assortativity.

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伊壁鸠鲁理性与进化稳定性
对伊壁鸠鲁的 "对一切不在我们能力范围内的事情都要消除厌恶 "这一戒律的经济学解释,是将偏好关系的对称因素扩展到非道德偏好下的边界之外,以便对仅因个人控制之外的事情而产生的不同结果漠不关心。本文研究了在囚徒困境博弈中由随机匹配的纳什代理人和伊壁鸠鲁代理人组成的群体的进化动态。结果表明,当进化动力由物质报酬驱动时,纳什类型是完全随机匹配下的ESS,而在不完全随机匹配下,纳什或伊壁鸠鲁类型都可能是ESS。然而,当选择由效用回报驱动时,纳什类型永远不会成为ESS,而如果匹配过程表现出足够高的同类性,伊壁鸠鲁类型就是ESS。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
5.60%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The journal aims to provide an international forum for a new approach to economics. Following the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter, it is designed to focus on original research with an evolutionary conception of the economy. The journal will publish articles with a strong emphasis on dynamics, changing structures (including technologies, institutions, beliefs and behaviours) and disequilibrium processes with an evolutionary perspective (innovation, selection, imitation, etc.). It favours interdisciplinary analysis and is devoted to theoretical, methodological and applied work. Research areas include: industrial dynamics; multi-sectoral and cross-country studies of productivity; innovations and new technologies; dynamic competition and structural change in a national and international context; causes and effects of technological, political and social changes; cyclic processes in economic evolution; the role of governments in a dynamic world; modelling complex dynamic economic systems; application of concepts, such as self-organization, bifurcation, and chaos theory to economics; evolutionary games. Officially cited as: J Evol Econ
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