Emission reduction technology R&D and sharing with environmental corporate social responsibility

Abstract

This study constructs a duopoly model of emission reduction technology R&D and sharing with environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) and obtains the equilibrium results by backward induction. This study aims to explore the boundary conditions of technology R&D and sharing and investigate the effects of technology sharing, decision sequence, and negative externality on the equilibrium results. The results show that the emission reduction technology R&D and sharing decisions depend on the cost coefficient of emission reduction, R&D cost, and sharing cost. Different decision sequences have different effects on profits, utilities, environmental damage, consumer surplus, and social welfare. If the government decides first, firms will undertake ECSR only if the government provides the carbon subsidy. If the firms decide first, when marginal environmental damage is within a certain range, firms will undertake ECSR. Negative externality only affects the firms' utilities.