Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel
{"title":"On sibyl-proof mechanisms","authors":"Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel","doi":"arxiv-2407.14485","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only\nnon-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a\nsecond price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private\ninformation, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a\nhighest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.14485","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only
non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a
second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private
information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a
highest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.
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