The “Two Koreas” Problem in U.S. Policy, 1974–1980

Abstract

In this article, the author charts the evolution of US Korea policy after the failed attempts to establish a unification dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the reduction of the US military presence on the peninsula in 1974–1980. In 1973, The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which the Americans had supported for decades, ceased operations. The question of the fate of the United Nations Command loomed large. On the whole, in 1974–1980, the Americans did not reduce their military presence in Korea. At the same time, diplomatic support for negotiations on this topic and participation in maintaining the inter-Korean dialogue on the status of the ROK and DPRK in the UN and scenarios for possible unification of the country were quite effective. The Americans managed to prevent destabilisation in South Korea even in the face of a sudden change of power following the assassination of Park Chung-Hee. Simultaneously, the necessary international structures, such as the ROK/US Joint Forces Command, were put in place. Moreover, US diplomats managed to preserve even such a relic of the Korean War as the UN Command. At the same time, the issue of Korean unification had by this time become an instrument of political manipulation by all countries concerned. Under these circumstances, unification could not be achieved by diplomatic means alone.