Some Remarks on the Requirements for Scientific Theory in the Context of Many-worlds Models

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.