Hypnosis, Free Will, and Consciousness.

Abstract

Hypnosis has sometimes been described as an "altered state of consciousness," but what is "unaltered" consciousness? We approach the issue by first exploring the sense of free will, because it can be lost during hypnosis. However, the argument is developed that free will is an illusion, so should not be present in the waking state. Thus, in a sense, hypnosis is a more accurate state of consciousness. The sense of free will is shown to result from an experience of agency, which is often missing in hypnosis. We consider how hypnotic, illusory perceptions are developed, and plausible processes are discussed, but none throws clear light upon what the philosopher David Chalmers called the "hard problem" of consciousness. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the possibility that phenomenal consciousness is associated with feedback loops, which transform the simple registering of stimuli into experiences of which we are aware.