Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory

Abstract

Good‐for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good‐simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good‐simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good‐for theorist might pursue to address these apparently valuable acts, for example by appealing to the acts’ connection to beneficial character traits or practices, and I argue that none of these strategies succeed. Instead, I propose that the best way to understand the value of these acts involves seeing them as appropriate responses to what is good‐simpliciter, and more specifically, as ways of loving what is worthy of love.