A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition p can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject S even though p is a posteriori and S does not know p. The identity relation is well‐behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti‐Millianism requires.
本文提出了一个新论点，通过认识论的可能性（所有 S 都知道 p），从模态到米利安主义（Millianism），即专名的语义内容仅仅是其承载者这一有争议的论点。该书为各种认识论模态概念提供了新定义。证明了关于认识论必然性的一个惊人定理。即使命题 p 是后验的，而且 S 不知道 p，但对于一个认识主体 S 来说，命题 p 在认识论上可能是必要的。虽然刘易斯-卡罗尔不是查尔斯-路特维奇-道奇森在认识论上是可能的，但这在反威廉主义所要求的认识论上是不可能的。
{"title":"From modality to millianism","authors":"Nathan Salmón","doi":"10.1111/nous.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12536","url":null,"abstract":"A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (<jats:italic>for all S knows, p</jats:italic>), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject <jats:italic>S</jats:italic> even though <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is a posteriori and <jats:italic>S</jats:italic> does not know <jats:italic>p</jats:italic>. The identity relation is well‐behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti‐Millianism requires.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142599304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Censorship involves, inter alia, adopting a certain type of epistemic policy. While much has been written on the harms and benefits of free expression and the associated rights thereof, the epistemic preconditions of justified censorship are relatively underexplored. In this paper, I argue that examining intrapersonal norms of how we ought to treat evidence that might come to us over time can shed light on interpersonal norms of evidence generation and sharing that are relevant in the context of censorship. The upshot is that justified censorship requires the censor to meet a very high epistemic burden regarding the target proposition(s)—importantly, one that exceeds knowledge.
{"title":"The censor's burden","authors":"Hrishikesh Joshi","doi":"10.1111/nous.12534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12534","url":null,"abstract":"Censorship involves, inter alia, adopting a certain type of epistemic policy. While much has been written on the harms and benefits of free expression and the associated rights thereof, the epistemic preconditions of justified censorship are relatively underexplored. In this paper, I argue that examining <jats:italic>intrapersonal</jats:italic> norms of how we ought to treat evidence that might come to us over time can shed light on <jats:italic>interpersonal</jats:italic> norms of evidence generation and sharing that are relevant in the context of censorship. The upshot is that justified censorship requires the censor to meet a very high epistemic burden regarding the target proposition(s)—importantly, one that exceeds knowledge.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories of interpersonal aggregation besides utilitarianism, and by many decision theories besides expected value theory. Considering the range of consistent responses, we find all of them to be quite radical.
{"title":"Paradoxes of infinite aggregation","authors":"Frank Hong, Jeffrey Sanford Russell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12535","url":null,"abstract":"There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a <jats:italic>Pareto</jats:italic> principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a <jats:italic>statewise dominance</jats:italic> principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories of interpersonal aggregation besides utilitarianism, and by many decision theories besides expected value theory. Considering the range of consistent responses, we find all of them to be quite radical.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cian Dorr, Jacob Nebel, and Jake Zuehl have argued that no objects are incomparable in value. One set of arguments they offer depart from a principle they call ‘Strong Monotonicity’, which states that if x is good and y is not good, then x is better than y. In this article, we respond to those arguments, thereby defending the possibility of value incomparability.
{"title":"In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl","authors":"Erik Carlson, Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1111/nous.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12533","url":null,"abstract":"Cian Dorr, Jacob Nebel, and Jake Zuehl have argued that no objects are incomparable in value. One set of arguments they offer depart from a principle they call ‘Strong Monotonicity’, which states that if <jats:italic>x</jats:italic> is good and <jats:italic>y</jats:italic> is not good, then <jats:italic>x</jats:italic> is better than <jats:italic>y</jats:italic>. In this article, we respond to those arguments, thereby defending the possibility of value incomparability.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142555816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who killed the causality of things?","authors":"Robert Pasnau","doi":"10.1111/nous.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12525","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142487430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to many philosophers, “the meaning of life” refers to our cosmic purpose, the activity that we were created by God or a purposive universe to perform. If there is no God or teleology, there is no such thing as the meaning of life. But this need not be the last word on the matter. In this paper, I ask what the benefits provided by a cosmic purpose are, and go on to argue that thinking of our lives in a particular way—in terms of a unified life narrative—can supply us with many of those benefits. We might lose little if there is no such thing as the meaning of life, since there is still something that can provide much of what is valuable about it.
{"title":"Meaning, purpose, and narrative","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1111/nous.12532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12532","url":null,"abstract":"According to many philosophers, “the meaning of life” refers to our <jats:italic>cosmic purpose</jats:italic>, the activity that we were created by God or a purposive universe to perform. If there is no God or teleology, there is no such thing as the meaning of life. But this need not be the last word on the matter. In this paper, I ask what the benefits provided by a cosmic purpose are, and go on to argue that thinking of our lives in a particular way—in terms of <jats:italic>a unified life narrative</jats:italic>—can supply us with many of those benefits. We might lose little if there is no such thing as the meaning of life, since there is still something that can provide much of what is valuable about it.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142452071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hume offers not one, but two definitions of virtue: a more famous one in terms of usefulness or agreeability to the self or to others, and a second in terms of eliciting approbation or disapprobation from spectators. Some scholars endorse the former definition as the more fundamental one; others endorse the latter as more fundamental. This paper argues that neither definition is more fundamental than the other. The two definitions are distinct but complementary, in that they have to rely on each other in various ways.
{"title":"Humes definitions of virtue","authors":"Hsueh Qu","doi":"10.1111/nous.12531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12531","url":null,"abstract":"Hume offers not one, but two definitions of virtue: a more famous one in terms of usefulness or agreeability to the self or to others, and a second in terms of eliciting approbation or disapprobation from spectators. Some scholars endorse the former definition as the more fundamental one; others endorse the latter as more fundamental. This paper argues that neither definition is more fundamental than the other. The two definitions are distinct but complementary, in that they have to rely on each other in various ways.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by proposing various extensions to expected utility theory. As I show in this paper, such extensions often fall silent too, even in cases where the correct ranking is intuitively obvious. But we can extend the theory further than has been done before—I offer a new extension, Invariant Value Theory, which deals neatly with those problem cases and also satisfies various desirable conditions. But other prima facie desirable conditions, including Independence, the theory violates. Is this a problem for the proposal? It may not be—in a new impossibility result, I show that no theory can satisfy Independence in full generality without violating several other conditions that together seem just as plausible.
{"title":"Flummoxing expectations","authors":"Hayden Wilkinson","doi":"10.1111/nous.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12530","url":null,"abstract":"Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by proposing various extensions to expected utility theory. As I show in this paper, such extensions often fall silent too, even in cases where the correct ranking is intuitively obvious. But we can extend the theory further than has been done before—I offer a new extension, <jats:italic>Invariant Value Theory</jats:italic>, which deals neatly with those problem cases and also satisfies various desirable conditions. But other prima facie desirable conditions, including <jats:italic>Independence</jats:italic>, the theory violates. Is this a problem for the proposal? It may not be—in a new impossibility result, I show that <jats:italic>no</jats:italic> theory can satisfy Independence in full generality without violating several other conditions that together seem just as plausible.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation of a graph involves commitment to both (a) the in‐context reliability of the graph's framing devices and (b) the perspective‐relative accuracy of the graph's content. Despite apparent disagreements between my account and traditional accounts of assertion, the two are compatible and I argue that we should expect a similar pattern of commitments in a set of cases that extends beyond the graphical one. I end by demonstrating that the account resolves apparent tensions between the demands of honesty and the common scientific practice of presenting idealized or simplified graphs: these “distortions” can be honest so long as there's the right kind of alignment between the distortion and the background beliefs and values of the audience.
{"title":"How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony","authors":"Corey Dethier","doi":"10.1111/nous.12529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12529","url":null,"abstract":"I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation of a graph involves commitment to both (a) the in‐context reliability of the graph's framing devices and (b) the perspective‐relative accuracy of the graph's content. Despite apparent disagreements between my account and traditional accounts of assertion, the two are compatible and I argue that we should expect a similar pattern of commitments in a set of cases that extends beyond the graphical one. I end by demonstrating that the account resolves apparent tensions between the demands of honesty and the common scientific practice of presenting idealized or simplified graphs: these “distortions” can be honest so long as there's the right kind of alignment between the distortion and the background beliefs and values of the audience.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The significance or vacuity of the statement, “Everything has just doubled in size,” attracted considerable attention last century from scientists and philosophers. Presenting his conventionalism in geometry, Poincaré insisted on the emptiness of a hypothesis that all objects have doubled in size overnight. Such expansion could have meaning, he argued, “only for those who reason as if space were absolute … it would be better to say that space being relative, nothing at all has happened.” The logical empiricists concurred, viewing the universal doubling hypothesis as illustrating the intrinsic metrical amorphousness of continuous manifolds. It is striking, therefore, to find Kant invoking a universal contraction in space and time to support his famous doctrine of transcendental idealism. In one of several completely neglected passages, he writes: “The proof that the things in space and time are mere appearances can also be grounded on the fact that the whole world could be contained in a nutshell and the entirety of elapsed time in a second without the least difference being met with.” Kant's “also” may suggest an idealist argument distinct from any proposed in published works. Here I ask: What is the meaning of Kant's Nutshell Argument for Idealism?
{"title":"Kant's nutshell argument for idealism","authors":"Desmond Hogan","doi":"10.1111/nous.12528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12528","url":null,"abstract":"The significance or vacuity of the statement, “Everything has just doubled in size,” attracted considerable attention last century from scientists and philosophers. Presenting his conventionalism in geometry, Poincaré insisted on the emptiness of a hypothesis that all objects have doubled in size overnight. Such expansion could have meaning, he argued, “only for those who reason as if space were absolute … it would be better to say that space being relative, <jats:italic>nothing at all has happened</jats:italic>.” The logical empiricists concurred, viewing the universal doubling hypothesis as illustrating the intrinsic metrical amorphousness of continuous manifolds. It is striking, therefore, to find Kant invoking a universal <jats:italic>contraction</jats:italic> in space and time to support his famous doctrine of transcendental idealism. In one of several completely neglected passages, he writes: “The proof that the things in space and time are mere appearances can also be grounded on the fact that the whole world could be contained in a nutshell and the entirety of elapsed time in a second without the least difference being met with.” Kant's “also” may suggest an idealist argument distinct from any proposed in published works. Here I ask: What is the meaning of Kant's Nutshell Argument for Idealism?","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142321465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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