{"title":"Disclosing and cooling-off: An analysis of insider trading rules","authors":"Jun Deng , Huifeng Pan , Hongjun Yan , Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103913","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission: mandatory disclosure and “cooling-off period”. The former requires insiders disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before trading. These policies affect investors’ trading profits, risk sharing, and hence their welfare. If the insider has sufficiently large hedging needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from “sunshine trading”, disclosure reduces the welfare of all investors. In our calibration, a longer cooling-off period benefits speculators, and its implications for the insider and hedgers depend on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"160 ","pages":"Article 103913"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24001363/pdfft?md5=dbe47e22661fc40ff0c497bd1b33df36&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X24001363-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24001363","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission: mandatory disclosure and “cooling-off period”. The former requires insiders disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before trading. These policies affect investors’ trading profits, risk sharing, and hence their welfare. If the insider has sufficiently large hedging needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from “sunshine trading”, disclosure reduces the welfare of all investors. In our calibration, a longer cooling-off period benefits speculators, and its implications for the insider and hedgers depend on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.
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The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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