The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors

Wayne R. Landsman, F. Dimas Peña-Romera, Jianxin (Donny) Zhao
{"title":"The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors","authors":"Wayne R. Landsman, F. Dimas Peña-Romera, Jianxin (Donny) Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
机构投资者向风向标企业提供贷款的价值
我们预测,贷款银团中的机构投资者会向风向标企业收取较低的贷款利差,作为对其获取私人信息的补偿,这些信息有助于识别其他企业公开市场证券的交易机会。与这一预测相一致的是,在向钟点企业贷款时,机构投资者收取的贷款溢价比非钟点企业低 17-25 个基点,并从其他企业的证券交易中获得 1.5-2.2% 的年化超额回报。横截面分析结果显示,当来自风向标企业的私人信息价值较高时,贷款利差的降幅更大。此外,当机构贷款人贷款给透明度更高的风向标借款人时,以及当他们支付较低的价格--如贷款利差所反映的那样--以换取私人信息时,他们的超额收益较低,这支持了私人信息的价值与机构投资者的交易表现有关这一观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊最新文献
New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory Financial statements not required
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1