{"title":"Religious Expression and Exemptions in the Private Sector Workplace: Spotting Bias","authors":"Myriam Caroline Hunter-Henin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4911741","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Courts tasked with ruling on religious freedom claims in the private sector workplace have been faced with the following challenge: too weak a protection of religious freedom and it will become meaningless; too strong, and individual freedom will be stifled. Recently, courts on each side of the Atlantic have, respectively, leant towards each of these two extremes. In Europe, courts have afforded minimalist and, as I will argue, too restrictive a protection to religious interests. Whether out of deference to state constitutional traditions or economic interests, they have often undermined the protection of religious freedom. Conversely, in the United States, the Supreme Court has granted a maximalist and, as I will argue, excessive protection to religious interests. The article will demonstrate the flaws of each approach. It will unravel the main three types of bias that underlie these extreme positions, namely the state, the economic and the religious bias.","PeriodicalId":21855,"journal":{"name":"SSRN Electronic Journal","volume":"57 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SSRN Electronic Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4911741","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Courts tasked with ruling on religious freedom claims in the private sector workplace have been faced with the following challenge: too weak a protection of religious freedom and it will become meaningless; too strong, and individual freedom will be stifled. Recently, courts on each side of the Atlantic have, respectively, leant towards each of these two extremes. In Europe, courts have afforded minimalist and, as I will argue, too restrictive a protection to religious interests. Whether out of deference to state constitutional traditions or economic interests, they have often undermined the protection of religious freedom. Conversely, in the United States, the Supreme Court has granted a maximalist and, as I will argue, excessive protection to religious interests. The article will demonstrate the flaws of each approach. It will unravel the main three types of bias that underlie these extreme positions, namely the state, the economic and the religious bias.