Can a Supplier’s Yield Risk Be Truthfully Communicated via Cheap Talk?

Tao Lu
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Abstract

Problem definition: When a firm (buyer) outsources the production of a new product/component to a supplier subject to random yield, a major challenge is that the supplier’s yield is usually private information. In practice, yield information is often shared via nonbinding communication—for example, a supplier self-assessment report. We examine whether such communication can be truthful and credible. Methodology/results: We analyze a cheap-talk game in which, given a simple contract that specifies the prices for each unit ordered and for each effective unit delivered, the supplier first communicates its yield level, and then the buyer determines an order quantity. We prove that truthful communication can emerge in equilibrium. To do so, we first show that if knowing the supplier’s type, the buyer will either inflate or reduce the order quantity to cope with a lower yield, depending on the product’s market potential. Under asymmetric information, the supplier will truthfully communicate its type if (i) the buyer with a high market potential intends to inflate the order quantity for a lower yield, but the buyer with a low market potential prefers to do the reverse; and (ii) the supplier is uncertain about the product’s market potential, which is the buyer’s private information, and anticipates that a hard-to-make product is more likely to have a higher market potential. Managerial implications: Truthful cheap-talk communication can emerge in equilibrium when the product’s market size and yield are negatively correlated. Truthful communication always benefits the buyer and consumers and may benefit the supplier if the product has sufficient market potential and the supplier’s production cost is not too high. Moreover, the buyer can be better off paying more for the input quantity (although part of the output is defective) or paying a higher wholesale rate if the adjustment in payment terms enhances communication credibility.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0089 .
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供应商的收益风险能否通过廉价言论如实传达?
问题定义:当一家公司(买方)将新产品/组件的生产外包给一家供应商,而供应商的产量是随机的,这就面临着一个重大挑战,即供应商的产量通常是私人信息。在实践中,良品率信息通常通过非约束性沟通--例如供应商自我评估报告--来共享。我们将研究这种交流是否真实可信。方法/结果:我们分析了一个廉价话语博弈,在这个博弈中,给定一个简单的合同,规定每个订购单位和每个有效交付单位的价格,供应商首先通报其产量水平,然后买方确定订购数量。我们证明,真实交流可以在均衡中出现。为此,我们首先证明,如果知道供应商的类型,买方会根据产品的市场潜力,提高或降低订货量,以应对较低的产量。在信息不对称的情况下,如果(i) 市场潜力大的买方打算提高订货量以降低产量,而市场潜力小的买方则倾向于反其道而行之;(ii) 供货商不确定产品的市场潜力(这是买方的私人信息),并预计难以生产的产品更有可能具有较高的市场潜力,那么供货商就会如实告知其类型。对管理者的影响:当产品的市场规模和产量呈负相关时,真实的低价沟通会在均衡状态下出现。如果产品具有足够的市场潜力,且供应商的生产成本不太高,那么真实的沟通总是有利于买方和消费者,也可能有利于供应商。此外,如果付款条件的调整能提高沟通的可信度,那么买方最好为投入量支付更多的费用(尽管部分产出是次品)或支付更高的批发费率:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0089 。
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