ML-Based Trojan Classification: Repercussions of Toxic Boundary Nets

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) algorithms were recently adapted for testing integrated circuits and detecting potential design backdoors. Such testing mechanisms mainly rely on the available training dataset and the extracted features of the Trojan circuit. In this letter, we demonstrate that this method is attackable by exploiting a structural problem of classifiers for hardware Trojan (HT) detection in gate-level netlists, called the boundary net (BN) problem. There, an adversary modifies the labels of those BNs, connecting the original logic to the Trojan circuit. We show that the proposed adversarial label-flipping attacks (ALFAs) are potentially highly toxic to the accuracy of supervised ML-based Trojan detection approaches. The experimental results indicate that an adversary needs to flip only 0.09% of all labels to achieve an accuracy drop of over 9%, demonstrating one of the most efficient ALFAs in the HT detection research domain.