Security Performance of MOSMLFC Power System Under Historical-Frequency-Triggered DoS Attacks

Abstract

A memory output sliding mode load frequency control (MOSMLFC) strategy is proposed for multi-area interconnected power systems under historical-frequency-triggered denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Due to the use of the open network, the multi-area power system is prone to cyber-attacks. Different types of attack models have been built to describe the actual attack behavior, so that effective strategies can be quickly formulated in the event of an attack. Therefore, a historical-frequency-triggered DoS attacks model is presented from the perspective of attackers, with the aim of destroying the stable state of the multi-area power system. It is assumed that attackers determine the timing of DoS attacks by monitoring the operational status of multi-area power systems and designing the triggering condition with historical frequency. A MOSMLFC strategy is investigated to ensure the security performance of multi-area power systems under historical-frequency-triggered DoS attacks, which applies the memory output information of the power system to realize the controller design. The security condition of multi-area power systems under historical-frequency-triggered DoS attacks is obtained by Lyapunov’s theorem and linear matrix inequality (LMI). Numerical examples are tested over the IEEE 10-generator 39-bus system and the results prove the usefulness and superiority of the proposed method. Note to Practitioners—Load frequency control is widely applied in multi-area power systems to achieve a balance between the load demand and generation. Frequent cyber-attacks are a threat to the normal operation of the power system. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate strategies to defend against cyber-attacks. So far, there have been many different forms of cyber-attacks. This has prompted defenders to build different types of attack models to describe the actual attack behavior in order to preemptively formulate appropriate defensive strategies. Smart attacker may notice that certain characteristics of the target system are important, such as the power system frequency. This motivates us to propose a historical frequency-triggered DoS attack model that contributes to a deep understanding of the impact of cyber-attacks on the power system. We propose a unique sliding mode control approach to ensure the stable performance of power system state and output simultaneously.