Measuring socially appropriate social preferences

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.003
{"title":"Measuring socially appropriate social preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper extends the literature on structural estimation of social preferences to account for the desire to adhere to social norms and hide one's true intentions via moral wiggle room. We conduct an experiment to test whether accounting for normatively appropriate behavior allows us to distinguish between preference types who care about outcomes versus adhering to social norms and whether the introduction of moral wiggle room undermines the stability of social preference estimates. We find that social preference estimates are remarkably robust to the inclusion of moral wiggle room. However, the representative agent is strongly motivated by norms and failing to account for this motive in our model causes us to overestimate how much agents care about helping those who are worse off. Using finite mixture models to endogenously identify latent preference types, we replicate previous work finding that the majority of subjects can be classified as strong or moderate altruists when normative concerns are not considered. Accounting for the normative appropriateness of decisions when categorizing participants, however, reveals different motives across types: strong altruists are only marginally concerned with norms while the moderate altruists are highly sensitive to them and, once norms are taken into account, don't care at all about the outcomes of others. Our results thus recast the prior findings in a new light. Rather than the two most common types being strong altruists and moderate altruists, we find that they are better described as strong altruists and norm followers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001155","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on structural estimation of social preferences to account for the desire to adhere to social norms and hide one's true intentions via moral wiggle room. We conduct an experiment to test whether accounting for normatively appropriate behavior allows us to distinguish between preference types who care about outcomes versus adhering to social norms and whether the introduction of moral wiggle room undermines the stability of social preference estimates. We find that social preference estimates are remarkably robust to the inclusion of moral wiggle room. However, the representative agent is strongly motivated by norms and failing to account for this motive in our model causes us to overestimate how much agents care about helping those who are worse off. Using finite mixture models to endogenously identify latent preference types, we replicate previous work finding that the majority of subjects can be classified as strong or moderate altruists when normative concerns are not considered. Accounting for the normative appropriateness of decisions when categorizing participants, however, reveals different motives across types: strong altruists are only marginally concerned with norms while the moderate altruists are highly sensitive to them and, once norms are taken into account, don't care at all about the outcomes of others. Our results thus recast the prior findings in a new light. Rather than the two most common types being strong altruists and moderate altruists, we find that they are better described as strong altruists and norm followers.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
衡量适合社会的社会偏好
本文扩展了有关社会偏好结构性估计的文献,以考虑遵守社会规范的愿望和通过道德回旋余地隐藏自己真实意图的情况。我们进行了一项实验,以检验对规范性适当行为的考虑是否能让我们区分关心结果的偏好类型和遵守社会规范的偏好类型,以及道德回旋余地的引入是否会破坏社会偏好估计的稳定性。我们发现,社会偏好估计值对道德回旋余地的引入具有显著的稳健性。然而,具有代表性的代理人受到规范的强烈驱使,如果在我们的模型中没有考虑到这一动机,就会导致我们高估代理人对帮助处境更差的人的关心程度。利用有限混合模型来内生地识别潜在的偏好类型,我们重复了之前的工作,发现在不考虑规范性问题的情况下,大多数受试者可被归类为强烈或温和的利他主义者。然而,在对受试者进行分类时,如果考虑到决策的规范适当性,则会发现不同类型的受试者有不同的动机:强烈利他主义者对规范的关注度较低,而温和利他主义者对规范高度敏感,一旦考虑到规范,则根本不在乎他人的结果。因此,我们的研究结果从一个新的角度重新诠释了之前的发现。我们发现,与其将两种最常见的类型描述为强烈利他主义者和温和利他主义者,不如将他们描述为强烈利他主义者和准则追随者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
Towards data auctions with externalities Time for memorable consumption Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1