The role (and limits) of developmental neuroscience in determining adolescents’ autonomy rights: The case for reproductive and voting rights

Abstract

Neuroscientific evidence documenting continued neural development throughout adolescence has been leveraged in advocacy for more lenient treatment of adolescents in the criminal justice system. In recent years, developmental science, including neuroscience, has progressed and enabled more nuanced interpretations of what continuing neural development in adolescence likely means functionally for adolescents’ capabilities. However, oversimplified interpretations equating continuing neural development to overall “immaturity” are frequently used to make the case that adolescents should have fewer legal rights to make decisions on their own behalf, including regarding reproductive and voting rights. Here we address ongoing debates about adolescents’ autonomy rights and whether such rights should be expanded or restricted. We review extant neuroscientific and developmental research that can inform these debates. We call for: (1) a more nuanced application of developmental neuroscience to specific rights issues in specific contexts; (2) additional research designed to inform our understanding of the developmental benefits or harms of rights-based policies on young people over time; and (3) the grounding of developmental neuroscientific research on adolescents within a human rights framework. We offer suggestions to developmental and neuroscience scholars on how to discuss the science of adolescent development with those seeking guidance in their design of law and policy.