Does government regulations protecting employee privacy hurt employment? The Impact of Salary History Bans on Employment

Ting Zhai
{"title":"Does government regulations protecting employee privacy hurt employment? The Impact of Salary History Bans on Employment","authors":"Ting Zhai","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100117","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is a long-standing debate over the merits of confidential and transparent pay. Yet, as some states and counties in the U.S. have implemented policies that prohibit employers from asking about historical pay, many top tech companies such as Apple have introduced corresponding policies. In particular, this paper examines whether they have impacted employment. In this paper, we use the implementation of the salary history ban as a ”quasi-natural experiment” to assess the impact of the policy on employment using a staggered difference-in-differences method based on county-level panel data from 2013 to 2021. The study shows that the salary history ban does not significantly contribute to the increase in employment levels in general; even the implementation of the salary history ban reduces employment in local firms by an average of 1.04% relative to firms in areas where the policy is not implemented. This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of salary history bans and provides a reference for further improvements in corporate payroll management systems in practice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"15 ","pages":"Article 100117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000211/pdfft?md5=49732887d9f01e3a5cc37403e4ac9efd&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000211-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Government and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000211","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

There is a long-standing debate over the merits of confidential and transparent pay. Yet, as some states and counties in the U.S. have implemented policies that prohibit employers from asking about historical pay, many top tech companies such as Apple have introduced corresponding policies. In particular, this paper examines whether they have impacted employment. In this paper, we use the implementation of the salary history ban as a ”quasi-natural experiment” to assess the impact of the policy on employment using a staggered difference-in-differences method based on county-level panel data from 2013 to 2021. The study shows that the salary history ban does not significantly contribute to the increase in employment levels in general; even the implementation of the salary history ban reduces employment in local firms by an average of 1.04% relative to firms in areas where the policy is not implemented. This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of salary history bans and provides a reference for further improvements in corporate payroll management systems in practice.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
保护员工隐私的政府法规会损害就业吗?薪资记录禁令对就业的影响
关于薪酬保密和透明的优劣,争论由来已久。然而,随着美国一些州和县实施了禁止雇主询问历史薪酬的政策,许多顶级科技公司(如苹果公司)也出台了相应的政策。本文特别研究了这些政策是否对就业产生了影响。在本文中,我们将薪资历史禁令的实施作为一个 "准自然实验",基于 2013 年至 2021 年的县级面板数据,采用交错差分法评估该政策对就业的影响。研究结果表明,工资历史禁令总体上并没有显著促进就业水平的提高;即使实施工资历史禁令,相对于未实施该政策地区的企业,当地企业的就业率也平均降低了 1.04%。本文为工资历史禁令的效果提供了新的实证证据,为在实践中进一步完善企业工资管理制度提供了参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Editorial Board The contributions of foreign aid and natural resource wealth to democratic institutions: Evidence from over 40 years of sub-Sahara Africa's history Editor's note: Market-preserving government, global value chains, trade remedies, center-state transfers, and foreign aid. The nature of market-preserving government Trade remedy measures and their effects on industry performance, and implicit government intentions: Changes in revealed comparative advantage indices in China, India, and Japan
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1