Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132
Alex O. Acheampong , John Taden
This study evaluates the influence of natural resource rents and foreign aid on democracy using panel data from 45 SSA countries from 1980 to 2021. Using five different democracy indices, six different foreign aid variables and six different natural resource rent variables, our endogeneity-corrected results establish the following conclusions: (i) all the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to multilateral foreign aid, total development assistance committee (DAC) aid and bilateral aid from Australia, the USA, the United Nations, and the European Union (ii) the political resource curse, rentier and repression theories are valid for rent from mineral, gas and oil resources (iii) the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to rent from coal and forest resources (iv) the effect of foreign aid on the democracy indices is contingent on natural resource wealth (v) these findings are robust to an alternative econometric estimation technique and specifications. The policy implications are discussed.
{"title":"The contributions of foreign aid and natural resource wealth to democratic institutions: Evidence from over 40 years of sub-Sahara Africa's history","authors":"Alex O. Acheampong , John Taden","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study evaluates the influence of natural resource rents and foreign aid on democracy using panel data from 45 SSA countries from 1980 to 2021. Using five different democracy indices, six different foreign aid variables and six different natural resource rent variables, our endogeneity-corrected results establish the following conclusions: (i) all the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to multilateral foreign aid, total development assistance committee (DAC) aid and bilateral aid from Australia, the USA, the United Nations, and the European Union (ii) the political resource curse, rentier and repression theories are valid for rent from mineral, gas and oil resources (iii) the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to rent from coal and forest resources (iv) the effect of foreign aid on the democracy indices is contingent on natural resource wealth (v) these findings are robust to an alternative econometric estimation technique and specifications. The policy implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130
Deepti Kohli
This paper focuses on the political aspect of intergovernmental transfers in India. By using a balanced panel data-set comprising of data on 28 Indian states and Union Territories for the period 2003–2023 for both Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections at the state-level, the aim is to investigate whether there occurs a politically motivated distribution of financial resources by the central government to the states in India? The analysis has been done for three categories of centre-state transfers: loans, grants and tax devolution. The regression estimations include various political controls such as, electoral competition between political parties, voter participation rate, government’s ideological leaning, centre-state partisan affiliation, government incumbency and a control for political lobbying. The findings of this study reveal a significant influence of various political forces on different categories of intergovernmental transfers in India. For instance, a greater political competition leads to a lowering of grants and a rise in tax devolution and loans provided by the central government in proportion to the state’s GDP. A left-leaning government ideology is found to entail an increase in the proportion of grants from the centre in proportion to the state’s GDP. In addition, a greater partisan affiliation between the central and state governments leads to an increase in the average proportion of grants and tax devolution provided to that state. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to the winning party in a state leads to a rise in the provision of loans and grants by the centre to that state, while tax devolution is dampened. All these results do provide some evidence in favour of electoral opportunism and lobbying at work in the distribution of financial resources across Indian states.
{"title":"Political determinants of centre-state transfers: An empirical analysis across Indian states","authors":"Deepti Kohli","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper focuses on the political aspect of intergovernmental transfers in India. By using a balanced panel data-set comprising of data on 28 Indian states and Union Territories for the period 2003–2023 for both Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections at the state-level, the aim is to investigate whether there occurs a politically motivated distribution of financial resources by the central government to the states in India? The analysis has been done for three categories of centre-state transfers: loans, grants and tax devolution. The regression estimations include various political controls such as, electoral competition between political parties, voter participation rate, government’s ideological leaning, centre-state partisan affiliation, government incumbency and a control for political lobbying. The findings of this study reveal a significant influence of various political forces on different categories of intergovernmental transfers in India. For instance, a greater political competition leads to a lowering of grants and a rise in tax devolution and loans provided by the central government in proportion to the state’s GDP. A left-leaning government ideology is found to entail an increase in the proportion of grants from the centre in proportion to the state’s GDP. In addition, a greater partisan affiliation between the central and state governments leads to an increase in the average proportion of grants and tax devolution provided to that state. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to the winning party in a state leads to a rise in the provision of loans and grants by the centre to that state, while tax devolution is dampened. All these results do provide some evidence in favour of electoral opportunism and lobbying at work in the distribution of financial resources across Indian states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129
Keiichi Iwase, Shuichi Ishida
This study introduces a two-dimensional matrix analysis method that utilizes revealed comparative advantage and revealed comparative disadvantage indices. It aims to clarify the impact of trade remedy measures on beneficiary industries' performance. We compare the effects of these measures across both growing and mature industries. In the former case, we examine the steel industries in China and India, while in the latter case, we focus on Japan's basic chemicals and other products. By tracking the changes in the revealed comparative advantage and disadvantage indices before and after the execution of each measure, we identify distinct patterns depending on the industry's developmental stage. Although trade remedy measures are defined as countermeasures against unfair trade practices, this distinction enables us to determine whether trade remedy measures serve as tools for enhancing and sustaining industrial competitiveness or averting competitive disadvantages effectively with implicit intentions of governments. Furthermore, this analytical framework also provides insights into industry conditions. Its versatility extends to potential applications in corporate management and policy evaluation.
{"title":"Trade remedy measures and their effects on industry performance, and implicit government intentions: Changes in revealed comparative advantage indices in China, India, and Japan","authors":"Keiichi Iwase, Shuichi Ishida","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study introduces a two-dimensional matrix analysis method that utilizes revealed comparative advantage and revealed comparative disadvantage indices. It aims to clarify the impact of trade remedy measures on beneficiary industries' performance. We compare the effects of these measures across both growing and mature industries. In the former case, we examine the steel industries in China and India, while in the latter case, we focus on Japan's basic chemicals and other products. By tracking the changes in the revealed comparative advantage and disadvantage indices before and after the execution of each measure, we identify distinct patterns depending on the industry's developmental stage. Although trade remedy measures are defined as countermeasures against unfair trade practices, this distinction enables us to determine whether trade remedy measures serve as tools for enhancing and sustaining industrial competitiveness or averting competitive disadvantages effectively with implicit intentions of governments. Furthermore, this analytical framework also provides insights into industry conditions. Its versatility extends to potential applications in corporate management and policy evaluation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133
Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li
{"title":"Editor's note: Market-preserving government, global value chains, trade remedies, center-state transfers, and foreign aid.","authors":"Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131
Yi-Jiang Wang
This paper offers a framework for understanding the origin of market-preserving government. The paper shows that when parties in a Hobbesian society end in an arms race rather than war, they can create a market-preserving government to maintain the no-war equilibrium at lower cost. The government can be small yet effective or larger and more efficient. Under certain conditions, the parties are better off completely disarming themselves, paving the road for a modern society with equal rights for all citizens and a government monopoly on violence. The war-economic theory of political development sheds light on historical experiences and contemporary policy issues.
{"title":"The nature of market-preserving government","authors":"Yi-Jiang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper offers a framework for understanding the origin of market-preserving government. The paper shows that when parties in a Hobbesian society end in an arms race rather than war, they can create a market-preserving government to maintain the no-war equilibrium at lower cost. The government can be small yet effective or larger and more efficient. Under certain conditions, the parties are better off completely disarming themselves, paving the road for a modern society with equal rights for all citizens and a government monopoly on violence. The war-economic theory of political development sheds light on historical experiences and contemporary policy issues.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128
Shai Dothan , Mitja Kovac , Rok Spruk
This paper examines the potential impact of institutional shocks on long-term development of property rights and on institutions regulating contracting. The paper seeks to demonstrate that the external institutional shocks might have an uncontemplated side-effect on the institutional development of Mexico. The analysis exploits the within-country variation in the presence of US administrative authorities during the Mexican-American conflict across Mexican states and cities. Using propensity score and nearest neighbour matching technique, we present some evidence of the potential long-term institutional implications of the presence of US administrative authorities. We show that the presence of US administrative authority generated an unexpected positive effect which could influence long-term property rights and contracting institutions of Mexican states. The positive impact of US administrative authorities’ presence are robust to a variety of specification checks and are particularly large for smaller cities.
{"title":"Long-term effects of deep institutional shocks: Historical evidence from Mexico","authors":"Shai Dothan , Mitja Kovac , Rok Spruk","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the potential impact of institutional shocks on long-term development of property rights and on institutions regulating contracting. The paper seeks to demonstrate that the external institutional shocks might have an uncontemplated side-effect on the institutional development of Mexico. The analysis exploits the within-country variation in the presence of US administrative authorities during the Mexican-American conflict across Mexican states and cities. Using propensity score and nearest neighbour matching technique, we present some evidence of the potential long-term institutional implications of the presence of US administrative authorities. We show that the presence of US administrative authority generated an unexpected positive effect which could influence long-term property rights and contracting institutions of Mexican states. The positive impact of US administrative authorities’ presence are robust to a variety of specification checks and are particularly large for smaller cities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127
José Firmino de Sousa Filho , Gervásio Ferreira dos Santos , Luiz Carlos de Santana Ribeiro , Rodrigo Barbosa de Cerqueira , Larissa Lopes Lima
We analyze the BRICs countries' role in Global Value Chains (GVCs) and their trade patterns in value-added and vertical specialization, using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) from 2000-2014 with a decomposition model of intermediate goods and trade flows. Our findings reveal increased connectivity within global value chains, particularly for China and India. China significantly advances GVCs and intra-BRICs trade, focusing on high and medium-high technology industries. Brazil and Russia, however, have limited participation in GVCs, mainly engaging in value-added trade for medium-low and low-technology industries. Our network analysis reveals increasing connections between countries in global value chains, particularly for China and India. India excels in medium-technology goods and has increased its share in GVCs. While India and China demonstrate strong vertical specialization, Brazil and Russia concentrate major component exports on domestic value-added. Our study emphasizes the importance of expanding coordinated government policies among BRICs countries to foster value-added trade gains and industrial development. Governments in BRICs must address the strategic gaps to leverage their domestic resources effectively within the GVC framework.
{"title":"Global value chains and intra-BRICs trade in value-added","authors":"José Firmino de Sousa Filho , Gervásio Ferreira dos Santos , Luiz Carlos de Santana Ribeiro , Rodrigo Barbosa de Cerqueira , Larissa Lopes Lima","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the BRICs countries' role in Global Value Chains (GVCs) and their trade patterns in value-added and vertical specialization, using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) from 2000-2014 with a decomposition model of intermediate goods and trade flows. Our findings reveal increased connectivity within global value chains, particularly for China and India. China significantly advances GVCs and intra-BRICs trade, focusing on high and medium-high technology industries. Brazil and Russia, however, have limited participation in GVCs, mainly engaging in value-added trade for medium-low and low-technology industries. Our network analysis reveals increasing connections between countries in global value chains, particularly for China and India. India excels in medium-technology goods and has increased its share in GVCs. While India and China demonstrate strong vertical specialization, Brazil and Russia concentrate major component exports on domestic value-added. Our study emphasizes the importance of expanding coordinated government policies among BRICs countries to foster value-added trade gains and industrial development. Governments in BRICs must address the strategic gaps to leverage their domestic resources effectively within the GVC framework.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126
Şevket Pamuk
State directed industrialization in developing countries became a common strategy after World War II. The success of a small number of countries in East Asia added new dimensions to the debates on the role of states in taming domestic and international market forces. However, it soon became evident that states and government-private sector relations in developing countries show a great deal of variation which is reflected in the different degrees of success with state directed industrialization. This paper focuses on a country which has experienced above average rates of industrialization but has not been amongst the most successful cases. It examines the evolution of the larger political order, the state-private sector relations and the related “micro” institutions in four periods. One key finding is that the international environment has not always been conducive to industrialization. Moreover, industrialization outcomes did not depend on a single or a specific set of institutions but on the relations between the political and private sector elites, and more generally, on the political economy.
{"title":"The state and industrialization in Turkey since the nineteenth century","authors":"Şevket Pamuk","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>State directed industrialization in developing countries became a common strategy after World War II. The success of a small number of countries in East Asia added new dimensions to the debates on the role of states in taming domestic and international market forces. However, it soon became evident that states and government-private sector relations in developing countries show a great deal of variation which is reflected in the different degrees of success with state directed industrialization. This paper focuses on a country which has experienced above average rates of industrialization but has not been amongst the most successful cases. It examines the evolution of the larger political order, the state-private sector relations and the related “micro” institutions in four periods. One key finding is that the international environment has not always been conducive to industrialization. Moreover, industrialization outcomes did not depend on a single or a specific set of institutions but on the relations between the political and private sector elites, and more generally, on the political economy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142658486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100118
Massimo Amato , Everardo Belloni , Carlo A. Favero , Lucio Gobbi , Ludovica Priviero
This paper proposes the establishment of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as a tool for the efficient management of Eurozone public debt, to address two primary risks: roll-over and sustainability risk. The proposed EDA would price its loans using a transparent formula that would anchor the price to fundamental economic factors. This approach would encourage fiscal discipline among Member States and avoid inefficient costs resulting from market price deviations from fundamentals, without resorting to debt mutualization. In addition, the paper suggests that adopting flexible fiscal rules alongside the EDA could result in a smoother path towards debt stabilization, by mitigating the macroeconomic effects of excessive fluctuations in risk premia. The simulations indicate that this combination could offer a comprehensive strategy for managing sovereign debt in the Eurozone that would promote fiscal responsibility and stability.
{"title":"European sovereign debt risk management: The role of a European Debt Agency","authors":"Massimo Amato , Everardo Belloni , Carlo A. Favero , Lucio Gobbi , Ludovica Priviero","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100118","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100118","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper proposes the establishment of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as a tool for the efficient management of Eurozone public debt, to address two primary risks: roll-over and sustainability risk. The proposed EDA would price its loans using a transparent formula that would anchor the price to fundamental economic factors. This approach would encourage fiscal discipline among Member States and avoid inefficient costs resulting from market price deviations from fundamentals, without resorting to debt mutualization. In addition, the paper suggests that adopting flexible fiscal rules alongside the EDA could result in a smoother path towards debt stabilization, by mitigating the macroeconomic effects of excessive fluctuations in risk premia. The simulations indicate that this combination could offer a comprehensive strategy for managing sovereign debt in the Eurozone that would promote fiscal responsibility and stability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"15 ","pages":"Article 100118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000223/pdfft?md5=7d9eeb8a5323d6e57740318b64ac601d&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000223-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142270807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100119
Abraham Lartey
It has often been argued that countries that produce natural resources mobilize less non-resource tax revenues than other countries. In this paper, we exploit the exogenous variation in the timing of giant oilfield discoveries to estimate the causal impact of natural resources on taxation. The timing of giant oilfield discoveries is arguably exogenous and thus renders them appealing to empirically examine this argument. This allows us to examine the performance of non-resource tax revenue effort before and immediately after discovery as well as the period corresponding to the inflow of revenues from the production. We find that non-resource tax revenues tend to increase in the period following the discovery before the onset of production and after production commences. This effect is due to an increase in non-resource indirect tax revenues. Further analysis shows that both the total and indirect non-resource tax revenues, experience an increase in only low- -middle income countries, and largely driven by an increase in the consumption of goods and services.
{"title":"Government responses to oilfield discoveries: Impact of resource wealth on non-resource tax revenues","authors":"Abraham Lartey","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100119","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100119","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It has often been argued that countries that produce natural resources mobilize less non-resource tax revenues than other countries. In this paper, we exploit the exogenous variation in the timing of giant oilfield discoveries to estimate the causal impact of natural resources on taxation. The timing of giant oilfield discoveries is arguably exogenous and thus renders them appealing to empirically examine this argument. This allows us to examine the performance of non-resource tax revenue effort before and immediately after discovery as well as the period corresponding to the inflow of revenues from the production. We find that non-resource tax revenues tend to increase in the period following the discovery before the onset of production and after production commences. This effect is due to an increase in non-resource indirect tax revenues. Further analysis shows that both the total and indirect non-resource tax revenues, experience an increase in only low- -middle income countries, and largely driven by an increase in the consumption of goods and services.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"15 ","pages":"Article 100119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000235/pdfft?md5=e3b370cc9f9de8dd67c2f9473324c9db&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000235-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142315018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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