Optimal default options

IF 4.8 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105203
B. Douglas Bernheim , Jonas Mueller-Gastell
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem’s parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these “asymptotic optima” as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity’s value, simple forms of weighted opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity’s value.

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最佳默认选项
以往对最优默认选项的研究表明,在限制条件下,选择退出最小化或最大化都是最优的。我们通过研究当问题的一个参数接近极限值时的最优默认值,获得了解决方案的一般特征。我们将这些 "渐近最优 "解释为非极限情况下的近似最优,并通过数值模拟证明了这一解释的正确性。当设计者和选择者就活动价值达成一致时,简单形式的加权选择退出最小化就是渐近最优的。其他结果还包括 Pigouvian 费用、规范模糊性以及设计者和选择者对活动价值存在分歧的情况。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.10
自引率
2.00%
发文量
139
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Public Economics aims to promote original scientific research in the field of public economics, focusing on the utilization of contemporary economic theory and quantitative analysis methodologies. It serves as a platform for the international scholarly community to engage in discussions on public policy matters.
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