Better together? Group incentives and the demand for prevention

IF 5.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103365
Mylène Lagarde , Carlos Riumallo Herl
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Abstract

In a field experiment with 400 groups of informal entrepreneurs in El Salvador, we compare the impact of group incentives (linked to compliance of all members) to equivalent individual ones to encourage cardiovascular check-ups. We test two incentive designs: small rewards and lotteries. Group incentives are as effective as individual ones at increasing demand for prevention, but, unlike individual incentives, they fail to target those with potentially higher health risks. The equal effectiveness of group incentives is linked to more communication, coordination between members and, to some extent, peer pressure. These social dynamics contribute to reduce uncertainty about other group members’ decisions and enhance the perceived net benefit of prevention. Although the preventive check-ups do not induce short-term lifestyle changes, they substantially increase the detection of new risk factors, making all incentives highly cost-effective interventions in this population.

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更好地合作?团体激励和预防需求
在对萨尔瓦多 400 个非正规企业家团体进行的实地实验中,我们比较了团体激励(与所有成员的合规性挂钩)和同等个人激励对鼓励心血管检查的影响。我们测试了两种激励设计:小额奖励和抽奖。在提高预防需求方面,集体激励措施与个人激励措施同样有效,但与个人激励措施不同的是,集体激励措施未能针对那些潜在健康风险较高的人群。群体激励措施的同等效果与成员之间更多的沟通和协调有关,在一定程度上也与同伴压力有关。这些社会动态有助于减少对其他群体成员决定的不确定性,提高预防的净收益。虽然预防性体检并不能促使人们在短期内改变生活方式,但却能大大增加对新风险因素的发现,从而使所有激励措施在这一人群中都成为极具成本效益的干预措施。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
4.00%
发文量
126
审稿时长
72 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.
期刊最新文献
Editorial Board On the properties of the two main types of global poverty lines The local human capital costs of oil exploitation Cover more for less: Targeted drug coverage, chronic disease management, and medical spending Corrigendum to “Rural road stimulus and the role of matching mandates on economic recovery in China” [J. Dev. Econ. 166, (January 2024), 103211]
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