A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014
A.G. Bonifacio , E. Inarra , P. Neme
{"title":"A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games","authors":"A.G. Bonifacio ,&nbsp;E. Inarra ,&nbsp;P. Neme","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a “reduced form” of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 1-22"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001192","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a “reduced form” of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
联盟形成博弈中吸收集的表征
在联盟形成博弈中,给定一个标准的近视过程,吸收集就是联盟结构的最小集合,一旦进入这个过程,就永远不会离开。吸收集是联盟形成博弈中一个重要的解概念,但它也有缺点:吸收集可能很大,而且很难获得。在本文中,我们用一个由少量联盟集组成的集合来描述吸收集,并将其称为博弈的 "简化形式"。我们运用我们的表征来研究几种经济环境下的稳定性收敛。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007) Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts Editorial Board Editorial Board Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1