The Moral Law as an A Priori Principle. Kleingeld and Willaschek on Autonomy

Abstract

According to a common reading of Kant, autonomy refers to the idea that pure reason gives the moral law to itself. Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek reject this standard view both on textual as well as philosophical grounds. Instead, they argue that autonomy only selects mid-level principles, such as ‘help others,’ and that the moral law is a priori and not given. – In this paper, I first analyze on textual grounds what Kant means when he says that a principle is a priori. I argue that Kant does not conceive of a priori laws as permanently existing entities. Rather they are the product of how reason necessarily functions if it is prompted by sensibility. Kant also uses the word ‘autonomy’ in this context. I then argue that this non-standard view of autonomy as an activity can meet the philosophical objections that Kleingeld and Willaschek raise against autonomy as a giving of the moral law.