The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-31 DOI:10.1007/s11151-024-09990-w

Tim Groseclose

引用次数: 0

Abstract

One of the most famous and outstanding formalizations of the Coase Conjecture is by Gul et al. (J Econ Theory 39(1):155–190, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4) peculiarity of their model—as well as nearly all other examinations of the Coase Conjecture, including that by Coase himself—is that it assumes that the monopolist and customers have the same discount rate. I re-examine their model, while relaxing this restriction. Gul et. al. show that, if the (common) discount rate of the monopolist and customers approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture follows. I show that one only needs the discount rate of the customers to approach one for this to be true. I also show a second result: If the customers’ discount rate is fixed at a value less than one, while the monopolist’s discount rate approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture is guaranteed not to follow.

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当垄断者和客户的贴现率不同时的科斯猜想

古尔等人(J Econ Theory 39(1):155-190, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4)对科斯猜想进行了最著名、最杰出的形式化，他们的模型--以及几乎所有其他对科斯猜想的研究，包括科斯本人的研究--的特点在于，它假定垄断者和顾客具有相同的贴现率。我重新研究了他们的模型，同时放宽了这一限制。古尔等人的研究表明，如果垄断者和顾客的（共同）贴现率接近于 1，那么科斯猜想就会成立。我的研究表明，只需客户的贴现率接近 1，科斯猜想就会成立。我还展示了第二个结果：如果客户的贴现率固定在一个小于 1 的值，而垄断者的贴现率接近 1，那么科斯猜想就一定不会成立。

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来源期刊

Review of Industrial Organization Multiple-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons. The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies. The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content. The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession. Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ

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