Vertical reform of environmental protection, corruption and enterprise pollution reduction—a quasi-natural experiment based on 238 cities in China

Abstract

Under the background of increasingly serious environmental pollution, how to effectively restrain the pollution emissions of enterprises has become an urgent problem facing China. Based on the perspective of “quasi-natural experiment” of environmental protection vertical management reform and official corruption, taking 238 cities in China from 2011 to 2019 as samples, this paper studies the impact and mechanism of “environmental protection vertical reform” on enterprise pollution reduction by adopting multi-stage double difference method and intermediary effect model, and explores the reasons for the differences in environmental governance effects of “environmental protection vertical reform” based on regional heterogeneity and political binding heterogeneity, and also explore the regulatory role of human capital on the impact of “environmental protection vertical reform” on enterprise’s pollution reduction. It is found that “environmental protection vertical reform” can not only directly restrain the pollutant discharge of enterprises, but also reduce the pollutant discharge of enterprises by restraining corruption; There are regional differences in its impact, and it has a more significant effect on pollution reduction in the eastern region with high economic development level and provincial capitals with strong political binding force; However, human capital negatively regulates the promotion of corruption to enterprise sewage discharge. Therefore, local governments should formulate differentiated environmental rules and regulations, and accelerate the deepening of environmental protection reform. At the same time, enterprises should improve the environmental information disclosure system, enhance environmental awareness and promote the green transformation of enterprises.