{"title":"Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition","authors":"R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme","doi":"arxiv-2409.05315","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of\nthe set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the\npartition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition\nis the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We\nestablish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple\nanonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"203 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05315","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of
the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the
partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition
is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We
establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple
anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.
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