Tatiana Belova, Yuriy Dementiev, Fedor V. Fomin, Petr A. Golovach, Artur Ignatiev
{"title":"How to guide a present-biased agent through prescribed tasks?","authors":"Tatiana Belova, Yuriy Dementiev, Fedor V. Fomin, Petr A. Golovach, Artur Ignatiev","doi":"arxiv-2408.13675","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The present bias is a well-documented behavioral trait that significantly\ninfluences human decision-making, with present-biased agents often prioritizing\nimmediate rewards over long-term benefits, leading to suboptimal outcomes in\nvarious real-world scenarios. Kleinberg and Oren (2014) proposed a popular\ngraph-theoretical model of inconsistent planning to capture the behavior of\npresent-biased agents. In this model, a multi-step project is represented by a\nweighted directed acyclic task graph, where the agent traverses the graph based\non present-biased preferences. We use the model of Kleinberg and Oren to address the principal-agent\nproblem, where a principal, fully aware of the agent's present bias, aims to\nmodify an existing project by adding or deleting tasks. The challenge is to\ncreate a modified project that satisfies two somewhat contradictory conditions.\nOn one hand, the present-biased agent should select specific tasks deemed\nimportant by the principal. On the other hand, if the anticipated costs in the\nmodified project become too high for the agent, there is a risk of the agent\nabandoning the entire project, which is not in the principal's interest. To tackle this issue, we leverage the tools of parameterized complexity to\ninvestigate whether the principal's strategy can be efficiently identified. We\nprovide algorithms and complexity bounds for this problem.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.13675","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The present bias is a well-documented behavioral trait that significantly
influences human decision-making, with present-biased agents often prioritizing
immediate rewards over long-term benefits, leading to suboptimal outcomes in
various real-world scenarios. Kleinberg and Oren (2014) proposed a popular
graph-theoretical model of inconsistent planning to capture the behavior of
present-biased agents. In this model, a multi-step project is represented by a
weighted directed acyclic task graph, where the agent traverses the graph based
on present-biased preferences. We use the model of Kleinberg and Oren to address the principal-agent
problem, where a principal, fully aware of the agent's present bias, aims to
modify an existing project by adding or deleting tasks. The challenge is to
create a modified project that satisfies two somewhat contradictory conditions.
On one hand, the present-biased agent should select specific tasks deemed
important by the principal. On the other hand, if the anticipated costs in the
modified project become too high for the agent, there is a risk of the agent
abandoning the entire project, which is not in the principal's interest. To tackle this issue, we leverage the tools of parameterized complexity to
investigate whether the principal's strategy can be efficiently identified. We
provide algorithms and complexity bounds for this problem.