How to guide a present-biased agent through prescribed tasks?

Tatiana Belova, Yuriy Dementiev, Fedor V. Fomin, Petr A. Golovach, Artur Ignatiev
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Abstract

The present bias is a well-documented behavioral trait that significantly influences human decision-making, with present-biased agents often prioritizing immediate rewards over long-term benefits, leading to suboptimal outcomes in various real-world scenarios. Kleinberg and Oren (2014) proposed a popular graph-theoretical model of inconsistent planning to capture the behavior of present-biased agents. In this model, a multi-step project is represented by a weighted directed acyclic task graph, where the agent traverses the graph based on present-biased preferences. We use the model of Kleinberg and Oren to address the principal-agent problem, where a principal, fully aware of the agent's present bias, aims to modify an existing project by adding or deleting tasks. The challenge is to create a modified project that satisfies two somewhat contradictory conditions. On one hand, the present-biased agent should select specific tasks deemed important by the principal. On the other hand, if the anticipated costs in the modified project become too high for the agent, there is a risk of the agent abandoning the entire project, which is not in the principal's interest. To tackle this issue, we leverage the tools of parameterized complexity to investigate whether the principal's strategy can be efficiently identified. We provide algorithms and complexity bounds for this problem.
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如何引导偏重当前的代理完成规定任务?
当下偏差是一种有据可查的行为特征,它严重影响人类的决策,具有当下偏差的代理人通常会优先考虑眼前的回报而非长远利益,从而在现实世界的各种场景中导致次优结果。Kleinberg 和 Oren(2014 年)提出了一种流行的不一致规划图论模型,以捕捉有现时偏见的代理人的行为。在该模型中,一个多步骤项目由一个加权的有向无环任务图来表示,代理根据当前偏好来遍历该图。我们使用 Kleinberg 和 Oren 的模型来解决委托人-代理人问题,在这个问题中,委托人完全了解代理人的当前偏好,目的是通过添加或删除任务来修改现有项目。一方面,有当前偏见的代理人应该选择委托人认为重要的特定任务。另一方面,如果修改后项目的预期成本对代理人来说过高,代理人就有可能放弃整个项目,这不符合委托人的利益。为了解决这个问题,我们利用参数化复杂性工具来研究委托人的策略是否能被有效识别。我们为这个问题提供了算法和复杂度边界。
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