{"title":"Technical Report: Coopetition in Heterogeneous Cross-Silo Federated Learning","authors":"Chao Huang, Justin Dachille, Xin Liu","doi":"arxiv-2408.11355","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In cross-silo federated learning (FL), companies collaboratively train a\nshared global model without sharing heterogeneous data. Prior related work\nfocused on algorithm development to tackle data heterogeneity. However, the\ndual problem of coopetition, i.e., FL collaboration and market competition,\nremains under-explored. This paper studies the FL coopetition using a dynamic\ntwo-period game model. In period 1, an incumbent company trains a local model\nand provides model-based services at a chosen price to users. In period 2, an\nentrant company enters, and both companies decide whether to engage in FL\ncollaboration and then compete in selling model-based services at different\nprices to users. Analyzing the two-period game is challenging due to data\nheterogeneity, and that the incumbent's period one pricing has a temporal\nimpact on coopetition in period 2, resulting in a non-concave problem. To\naddress this issue, we decompose the problem into several concave sub-problems\nand develop an algorithm that achieves a global optimum. Numerical results on\nthree public datasets show two interesting insights. First, FL training brings\nmodel performance gain as well as competition loss, and collaboration occurs\nonly when the performance gain outweighs the loss. Second, data heterogeneity\ncan incentivize the incumbent to limit market penetration in period 1 and\npromote price competition in period 2.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"171 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.11355","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In cross-silo federated learning (FL), companies collaboratively train a
shared global model without sharing heterogeneous data. Prior related work
focused on algorithm development to tackle data heterogeneity. However, the
dual problem of coopetition, i.e., FL collaboration and market competition,
remains under-explored. This paper studies the FL coopetition using a dynamic
two-period game model. In period 1, an incumbent company trains a local model
and provides model-based services at a chosen price to users. In period 2, an
entrant company enters, and both companies decide whether to engage in FL
collaboration and then compete in selling model-based services at different
prices to users. Analyzing the two-period game is challenging due to data
heterogeneity, and that the incumbent's period one pricing has a temporal
impact on coopetition in period 2, resulting in a non-concave problem. To
address this issue, we decompose the problem into several concave sub-problems
and develop an algorithm that achieves a global optimum. Numerical results on
three public datasets show two interesting insights. First, FL training brings
model performance gain as well as competition loss, and collaboration occurs
only when the performance gain outweighs the loss. Second, data heterogeneity
can incentivize the incumbent to limit market penetration in period 1 and
promote price competition in period 2.