Laura Georgescu, James Fox, Anna Gautier, Michael Wooldridge
{"title":"Fixed-budget and Multiple-issue Quadratic Voting","authors":"Laura Georgescu, James Fox, Anna Gautier, Michael Wooldridge","doi":"arxiv-2409.06614","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Quadratic Voting (QV) is a social choice mechanism that addresses the\n\"tyranny of the majority\" of one-person-one-vote mechanisms. Agents express not\nonly their preference ordering but also their preference intensity by\npurchasing $x$ votes at a cost of $x^2$. Although this pricing rule maximizes\nutilitarian social welfare and is robust against strategic manipulation, it has\nnot yet found many real-life applications. One key reason is that the original\nQV mechanism does not limit voter budgets. Two variations have since been\nproposed: a (no-budget) multiple-issue generalization and a fixed-budget\nversion that allocates a constant number of credits to agents for use in\nmultiple binary elections. While some analysis has been undertaken with respect\nto the multiple-issue variation, the fixed-budget version has not yet been\nrigorously studied. In this work, we formally propose a novel fixed-budget\nmultiple-issue QV mechanism. This integrates the advantages of both the\naforementioned variations, laying the theoretical foundations for practical use\ncases of QV, such as multi-agent resource allocation. We analyse our\nfixed-budget multiple-issue QV by comparing it with traditional voting systems,\nexploring potential collusion strategies, and showing that checking whether\nstrategy profiles form a Nash equilibrium is tractable.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06614","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Quadratic Voting (QV) is a social choice mechanism that addresses the
"tyranny of the majority" of one-person-one-vote mechanisms. Agents express not
only their preference ordering but also their preference intensity by
purchasing $x$ votes at a cost of $x^2$. Although this pricing rule maximizes
utilitarian social welfare and is robust against strategic manipulation, it has
not yet found many real-life applications. One key reason is that the original
QV mechanism does not limit voter budgets. Two variations have since been
proposed: a (no-budget) multiple-issue generalization and a fixed-budget
version that allocates a constant number of credits to agents for use in
multiple binary elections. While some analysis has been undertaken with respect
to the multiple-issue variation, the fixed-budget version has not yet been
rigorously studied. In this work, we formally propose a novel fixed-budget
multiple-issue QV mechanism. This integrates the advantages of both the
aforementioned variations, laying the theoretical foundations for practical use
cases of QV, such as multi-agent resource allocation. We analyse our
fixed-budget multiple-issue QV by comparing it with traditional voting systems,
exploring potential collusion strategies, and showing that checking whether
strategy profiles form a Nash equilibrium is tractable.