{"title":"Distributed Learning Dynamics Converging to the Core of $B$-Matchings","authors":"Aya Hamed, Jeff S. Shamma","doi":"arxiv-2409.07754","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"$B$-matching is a special case of matching problems where nodes can join\nmultiple matchings with the degree of each node constrained by an upper bound,\nthe node's $B$-value. The core solution of a bipartite $B$-matching is both a\nmatching between the agents respecting the upper bound constraint and an\nallocation of the value of the edge among its nodes such that no group of\nagents can deviate and collectively gain higher allocation. We present two\nlearning dynamics that converge to the core of the bipartite $B$-matching\nproblems. The first dynamics are centralized dynamics in the nature of the\nHungarian method, which converge to the core in a polynomial time. The second\ndynamics are distributed dynamics, which converge to the core with probability\none. For the distributed dynamics, a node maintains only a state consisting of\n(i) its aspiration levels for all of its possible matches and (ii) the matches,\nif any, to which it belongs. The node does not keep track of its history nor is\nit aware of the environment state. In each stage, a randomly activated node\nproposes to form a new match and changes its aspiration based on the success or\nfailure of its proposal. At this stage, the proposing node inquires about the\naspiration of the agent it wants to match with to calculate the feasibility of\nthe match. The environment matching structure changes whenever a proposal\nsucceeds. A state is absorbing for the distributed dynamics if and only if it\nis in the core of the $B$-matching.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07754","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
$B$-matching is a special case of matching problems where nodes can join
multiple matchings with the degree of each node constrained by an upper bound,
the node's $B$-value. The core solution of a bipartite $B$-matching is both a
matching between the agents respecting the upper bound constraint and an
allocation of the value of the edge among its nodes such that no group of
agents can deviate and collectively gain higher allocation. We present two
learning dynamics that converge to the core of the bipartite $B$-matching
problems. The first dynamics are centralized dynamics in the nature of the
Hungarian method, which converge to the core in a polynomial time. The second
dynamics are distributed dynamics, which converge to the core with probability
one. For the distributed dynamics, a node maintains only a state consisting of
(i) its aspiration levels for all of its possible matches and (ii) the matches,
if any, to which it belongs. The node does not keep track of its history nor is
it aware of the environment state. In each stage, a randomly activated node
proposes to form a new match and changes its aspiration based on the success or
failure of its proposal. At this stage, the proposing node inquires about the
aspiration of the agent it wants to match with to calculate the feasibility of
the match. The environment matching structure changes whenever a proposal
succeeds. A state is absorbing for the distributed dynamics if and only if it
is in the core of the $B$-matching.