{"title":"Quantum panprotopsychism and the structure and subject-summing combination problem","authors":"Rodolfo Gambini, Jorge Pullin","doi":"arxiv-2409.01368","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a previous paper, we have shown that an ontology of quantum mechanics in\nterms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects, that is, a form of\npanprotopsychism, is well suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of\nconsciousness. We have proved there that the palette and grain combination\nproblems of panpsychism and panprotopsychism arise from implicit hypotheses\nbased on classical physics about supervenience that are inappropriate at the\nquantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states\narise. In this article, we address what is probably the first and most\nimportant combination problem of panpsychism: the subject-summing problem\noriginally posed by William James. We begin by identifying the physical\ncounterparts of the subjects of experience within the quantum panprotopsychic\napproach presented in that article. To achieve this, we turn to the notion of\nsubject of experience inspired by the idea of prehension proposed by Whitehead\nand show that this notion can be adapted to the quantum ontology of objects and\nevents. Due to the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics and its causal openness,\nthis ontology also seems to be suitable for the analysis of the remaining\naspects of the structure combination problem, which shows how the structuration\nof consciousness could have evolved from primitive animals to humans. The\nanalysis imposes conditions on possible implementations of quantum cognition\nmechanisms in the brain and suggests new problems and strategies to address\nthem. In particular, with regard to the structuring of experiences in animals\nwith different degrees of evolutionary development.","PeriodicalId":501517,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - QuanBio - Neurons and Cognition","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - QuanBio - Neurons and Cognition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.01368","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a previous paper, we have shown that an ontology of quantum mechanics in
terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects, that is, a form of
panprotopsychism, is well suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of
consciousness. We have proved there that the palette and grain combination
problems of panpsychism and panprotopsychism arise from implicit hypotheses
based on classical physics about supervenience that are inappropriate at the
quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states
arise. In this article, we address what is probably the first and most
important combination problem of panpsychism: the subject-summing problem
originally posed by William James. We begin by identifying the physical
counterparts of the subjects of experience within the quantum panprotopsychic
approach presented in that article. To achieve this, we turn to the notion of
subject of experience inspired by the idea of prehension proposed by Whitehead
and show that this notion can be adapted to the quantum ontology of objects and
events. Due to the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics and its causal openness,
this ontology also seems to be suitable for the analysis of the remaining
aspects of the structure combination problem, which shows how the structuration
of consciousness could have evolved from primitive animals to humans. The
analysis imposes conditions on possible implementations of quantum cognition
mechanisms in the brain and suggests new problems and strategies to address
them. In particular, with regard to the structuring of experiences in animals
with different degrees of evolutionary development.