{"title":"Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach","authors":"Vincent Meisner, Pascal Pillath","doi":"arxiv-2408.15196","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and non-rival\ngood with network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend\non how many others also consume the good. We characterize an algorithm that\nimplements the optimal allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights\nto digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in\nmonetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions,\ncommunity subsidies, and exclusivity bids.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.15196","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and non-rival
good with network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend
on how many others also consume the good. We characterize an algorithm that
implements the optimal allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights
to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in
monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions,
community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
