Management and Enforcement Theories for Compliance with the Rule of Law

IF 1.8 Q1 LAW European Journal of Risk Regulation Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI:10.1017/err.2024.47
Roila Mavrouli
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Abstract

Following the contemporary debate surrounding two alternative perspectives on compliance – enforcement and management – this article suggests an analysis through the lens of the rule of law crisis. Specifically, the financial and techno-managerial strategy developed by the EU for the indirect protection of the rule of law relies on mechanisms that combine characteristics from both the enforcement and management approaches. This article will identify these mechanisms, namely the European Semester, the Conditionality regulation, the European Structural Investment Funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, in order to determine their nature, features, and tools for ensuring compliance with the rule of law. The hypothesis of this article relies on the idea that the EU’s tools are characterised by a mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions. Considering that the deployment of the above measures has not re-established compliance, the EU strategy toes between inducing rule conformity on the one hand and deterring rule of law violations on the other. However, it seems that only the former can restore the rule of law, as the latter is considered ill-equipped to reverse or at least halt instances of backsliding. This mismatch explains why the Justice Scoreboard, the Framework, and the Review Cycle with its Annual Report have not made any difference, and more generally, why management strategies are unfit for dealing with deliberate backsliding.1

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遵守法治的管理和执行理论
在当代围绕守法的两种不同视角--执行和管理--展开讨论之后,本文建议从法治危机的角度进行分析。具体而言,欧盟为间接保护法治而制定的财政和技术管理战略依赖于兼具执法和管理两种方法特点的机制。本文将确定这些机制,即 "欧洲学期"、"条件性条例"、"欧洲结构性投资基金 "和 "恢复与复原基金",以确定其性质、特点和确保遵守法治的工具。本文的假设基于这样一种观点,即欧盟工具的特点是所发现问题的原因与所选择的解决方案不匹配。考虑到上述措施的部署并没有重新建立起遵纪守法的氛围,欧盟的战略在引导遵纪守法与阻止违反法治之间进行了权衡。然而,似乎只有前者才能恢复法治,因为后者被认为不具备扭转或至少阻止倒退的能力。这种不匹配解释了为什么司法记分牌、框架和审查周期及其年度报告没有起到任何作用,更广泛地说,为什么管理战略不适合处理故意倒退的问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: European Journal of Risk Regulation is an interdisciplinary forum bringing together legal practitioners, academics, risk analysts and policymakers in a dialogue on how risks to individuals’ health, safety and the environment are regulated across policy domains globally. The journal’s wide scope encourages exploration of public health, safety and environmental aspects of pharmaceuticals, food and other consumer products alongside a wider interpretation of risk, which includes financial regulation, technology-related risks, natural disasters and terrorism.
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