{"title":"Environmental interference","authors":"Karen Kovaka","doi":"10.1007/s10539-024-09955-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.</p>","PeriodicalId":55368,"journal":{"name":"Biology & Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Biology & Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-024-09955-z","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.
期刊介绍:
Recent decades have witnessed fascinating and controversial advances in the biological sciences. This journal answers the need for meta-theoretical analysis, both about the very nature of biology, as well as about its social implications.
Biology and Philosophy is aimed at a broad readership, drawn from both the sciences and the humanities. The journal subscribes to no specific school of biology, nor of philosophy, and publishes work from authors of all persuasions and all disciplines. The editorial board reflects this attitude in its composition and its world-wide membership.
Each issue of Biology and Philosophy carries one or more discussions or comparative reviews, permitting the in-depth study of important works and topics.